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[F]reedom... under government is to have a standing rule to live
by, common to every one of that society... a liberty to follow my
own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be
subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of an-
other man .... I
INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law .... -2
Imagine a convicted prisoner in a maximum security prison in
Hawaii. One day, without warning or explanation, prison authorities
remove the prisoner from his normal holding cell and place him into
solitary confinement without any notice or hearing. Instead of being
confined to a cell for twelve hours a day, the prisoner is confined,
alone, twenty-four hours a day, with the exception of a brief exercise
period. Common sense should dictate that the prison officer, a State
agent, has deprived the prisoner of a liberty interest without due pro-
cess of law. However, a plain reading of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Sandin v. ConnerO defies that common sense perception.
Prior to 1970, the judiciary rarely interfered with the states' ad-
ministration of their prison systems. 4 In the absence of constitutional
1 JOHN LocKE, THE SECOND TRFATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 22 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil
Blackwell 1966) (1690).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
4 See, e.g., William Babcock, Due Process in Prison Disciplinay Proceedings, 22 B.C. L.
Rnv. 1009, 1009 (1981); Charles H.Jones,Jr. & Edward Rhine, DueProcess and Prison Disci-
plinay Practices: From Wolff to Hewitt, 11 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Ciw. CONFINEMENT 44
(1985) (noting that the Warren Court's treatment ofjudicial review of prison administra-
tion did not mirror its tendency to increase the rights of criminal defendants).
1996]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
safeguards, state prisoners' rights were largely subject to the whims of
individual prison officials.5 However, during the late 1960s and 1970s,
the Supreme Court, in order to curtail potential arbitrary and vindic-
tive treatment of prisoners, began to limit the unchecked discretion of
prison officials by expanding procedural due process rights.6 Prior to
this period, the Supreme Court had no established body of law to pro-
vide guidance to prisoners seeking to invoke the Due Process Clause
directly, because the Court had not yet recognized the due process
interests of prisoners.7 To fill this void, the Court relied largely on
state-created positive law to define interests protected by the federal
Due Process Clause instead of reading such interests into the Clause
itself.. As a result, the federal courts were inappropriately drawn into
day-to-day prison administration due to the mandatory character of
individual state regulations.8 The Conner decision has remedied this
problem by vastly narrowing the ability of prisoners to draw upon state
positive-law sources to create protectible due process interests. How-
ever, by limiting what functionally has been the prisoners' only route
to due process protections during the last two decades, the Conner de-
cision has left a litany of arguably compelling interests defenseless in
the face of unfettered administrative discretion.
Part I of this Note details the historical development of the pris-
oners' procedural due process doctrine, focusing primarily on the
Court's dependence over the last twenty years on state-level positive-
law sources to define constitutionally protected liberty interests. Part
II focuses on the majority and dissenting opinions in Sandin v. Conner
itself. Part III argues that the Conner opinion narrows prisoner liberty-
interestjurisprudence into virtual non-existence. Part III also calls for
the Supreme Court to implement a new balancing test to determine
protected liberty interests by balancing the harm inflicted on prison-
ers against the need for orderly prison administration.
5 Cf Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 231 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (At one
time, "[t]he penitentiary inmate was considered 'the slave of the state.'") (citation
omitted).
6 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REv.
1044, 1175 (1984) ("[T]he Supreme Court itself has felt compelled to enter what it previ-
ously regarded as a closed system, to impose constraints on the way institutional officials
treat their charges.").
7 "Direct" readings of the Due Process Clause, for the purposes of this Note, connote
situations in which the Court finds a protected liberty interest inherent in the meaning of
the Due Process Clause itself. As discussed infra part I.B, most of the Court's prisoners'
due process jurisprudence involves liberty interests that arise from state positive-law
sources.




GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PRISONERS' PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS
A. Early Background: The Developments in Procedural Due
Process Jurisprudence Leading to The
State-Authorization Approach
1. Goldberg v. Kelly:9  An Expansionist Approach to Procedural
Due Process
In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court found that welfare recipi-
ents had the constitutional right to a hearing before their benefits
could be terminated. 10 This decision represented a radical departure
from the Court's previous doctrine-the Right-Privilege distinction."
Under this doctrine, state-authorized benefits were privileges, not
rights, and could be terminated without process. The Court explicitly
discarded this approach, 12 instead finding that trial-type procedures
were required before the statutorily authorized benefits could be ter-
minated.' 3 Because the state had conceded that the recipients did
have a due process interest in their benefit payments, the procedural
posture of Goldberg allowed the Court to focus on what process was
due, rather than defining the origin of the interest itself. Although
the Court did not explicitly hold that the removal of welfare benefits
implicated the Due Process Clause, 14 the decision as to what type of
process was due rested heavily on the Court's recognition of the
weight of the individual's interest.'5 The Court balanced the recipi-
ent's interest in not having benefits terminated against the govern-
9 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The movement towards extended procedural due process
protection began in the property context. Rubin, supra note 6, at 1062; see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-9, at 685-86 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that
during the 1970s the Court came to the aid of citizens who had become increasingly
dependent on the state machinery to safeguard their property rights and individual liberty
by insuring that this machinery was not run in an arbitrary fashion); Susan N. Herman, The
New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 482, 482 (1984) (stating that the Goldberg decision "triggered an explosion
in due process litigation.... .").
10 Goldberg; 397 U.S. at 261.
11 See Rubin, supra note 6, at 1061-62. The Supreme Court's pre-Goldberg approach
viewed state authorized benefits or protections as privileges instead of rights. Under this
approach, due process was not required before the termination of a benefit. Id. at 1053-60
(describing different rationales that the Court used to sidestep the wooden rights/privi-
leges dichotomy).
12 Goldberg; 397 U.S. at 262.
18 For a thorough discussion on the qualitative and temporal implications of various
types of procedural protections see HenryJ. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267, 1299-1304 (1975).
14 The question of whether recipients had an interest under the Due Process Clause
was not before the Goldberg Court. The respondent, the City of New York, had conceded
the point. Goldberg 397 U.S. at 260 n.7; see Rubin, supra note 6, at 1063.
15 Goldberg; 397 U.S. at 262-63.
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ment's interest, finding that the pre-deprivation procedures were
necessary.
The Goldberg decision was profoundly important. Goldberg "sig-
naled the Court's willingness to extend due process protections to the
daily operations of virtually every state and federal administrative
agency, and thus to a vast range of government benefits that had not
been explicitly protected by due process prior to that time."' 6 How-
ever, the potential breadth of the Goldberg decision quickly prompted
the Court to reconsider its procedural due process doctrine.
Goldberg's failure to explicitly enunciate the origin of the protected
interest allowed the Court, in subsequent due process decisions, to
curtail its due process jurisprudence by limiting the range of pro-
tected interests.
2. The Supreme Court's Retreat from the Goldberg Approach to a
Positivist Standard of Review
The overwhelming flood of litigation that followed in the wake of
Goldberg prompted the Supreme Court to retract the expansive proce-
dural due process doctrine it enunciated in that case." 7 The retrac-
tion occurred in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, which involved
an alleged denial of due process for a property interest.' 8 Roth ad-
dressed the right of teachers in the state university system to contin-
ued employment.19 Instead of following Goldberg's focus on when
16 Rubin, supra note 6, at 1063. Professor Tribe explains the Court's willingness to
expand its procedural grasp as a response to the new dependence of some citizens on the
increasingly pervasive welfare system. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 10-9, at 686. The Court was
influenced by Charles Reich's seminal article, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964),
which addressed the "new property" created by government dispensing wealth benefits to
citizens. According to Professor Tribe:
Perhaps responding to the alienation and affront to human dignity which
such complete dependence [on the welfare system] and vulnerability might
induce in circumstances where no alternative source of relief was available,
the Court ultimately rejected much of what remained of the rights-privi-
leges distinction. For the first time, the Court recognized as entitlements
interests founded neither on constitutional nor on common law claims of
right but only on a state-fostered (and hence justifiable) expectation . ..
which was derived from "an independent source such as state law".... [The
new statutory entitlements served) to surround the "core" of liberty and
property interests with a periphery activated, unlike the core, only by affirma-
tive state choices, but secure, once activated, against destruction without due
process of law.
TRIBE, supra note 9, § 10-9, at 686 (emphasis added) (quoting Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)) (citations omitted).
17 See, e.g., Herman, supra note 9, at 482-84; see also Rubin, supra note 6, at 1067 (argu-
ing that the Burger Court's response to the expansive nature of the Warren Court's doc-
trines was to limit rather than overrule those doctrines).
18 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
19 Under the applicable state law, teachers had no tenure rights until they served four
years of year-to-year employment. The teacher in Roth worked for one of the required four
[Vol. 81:744
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process was required,20 the Roth Court focused on whether a right exis-
ted at all.2 1 Goldberg's interest-balancing test remained in the due pro-
cess calculus, but only as a second tier of analysis to determine the
type of procedures required after a threshold inquiry established the
existence of a right.
22
After Roth, to establish the existence of a right, at least in the
property context,2 3 a person seeking due process relief had to show
that his or her entitlement was created "by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source such as state law."
24
Although the Court recognized the importance of continued employ-
ment to a teacher and conceded that it might be wise policy for states
to authorize pre-termination hearings by statute,2 5 it nevertheless held
that Roth's one year appointment "secured absolutely no interest in
re-employment" and accordingly was afforded no due process protec-
tion.2 6 Professor Susan Herman explains the significance of Roth's
approach:
By introducing this definitional stage into due process analysis, the
[Roth] Court embraced the idea that the protection provided by the
years under a contract that included an exact termination date and did not give any ex-
plicit right to renewal. Id. at 566-67.
20 See supra part I.A.1.
21 The Roth Court explicitly rejected the district court's interest balancing as the first
inquiry of a due process analysis. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71. The Court clarified that the
threshold due process question did not depend on a balancing of the interests, no matter
how major the concern involved. Instead, the determinative inquiry depended on "the
nature of the interest at stake." Id. at 570-71 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
The Roth approach "represented a marked change from Goldberg...." Rubin, supra
note 6, at 1066. It also signalled a departure from the general balancing approach that
began with Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 867 U.S. 886
(1961) (finding no constitutional rights only after a balancing of the individual's and
State's interests). The Roth opinion has received criticism from commentators for its virtu-
ally unsupported departure from interest balancing to determine what deprivations qualify
for due process protections. See; e.g., Herman, supra note 9, at 491.
22 Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.
23 The Roth Court did not limit a person's liberty interest to state authorized interests
or understood expectations. It identified a number of liberty interests that require due
process regardless of state law. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. In Roth the Court found that the
plaintiff's interest in continued employment did not constitute a liberty interest. However,
the Court stated there would be instances where it would find a liberty interest. The Court
cited, as examples, many cases where it found a liberty interest because an employee's
dismissal was for a cause that would bring his reputation into question or similarly place a
stigma "that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportuni-
ties." Id. at 573-74. The Court's concern for State action arbitrarily placing a "stigma" on a
person will reappear in its prison disciplinaryjurisprudence. See infra notes 69-70 and ac-
companying text.
24 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added). Compare with Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that a teacher may be able to receive due process protection of
tenure rights on an implied contractual basis).
25 Roth, 408 U.S. at 578-79.
26 Id. at 578.
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due process clause is limited. State interference with those interests
considered to be within the sphere of "life, liberty, or property"
would trigger a right to procedural fairness; those interests thought
to fall outside the definition would receive no procedural protec-
tion. In Goldberg v. Kelly and other cases before Roth, it had seemed
that certain interests might command due process protection be-
cause of their weight or impact on the individual. But Roth rejected
the weight of the interest as a criterion for determining when proce-
dural fairness is required. According to Roth, the weight of the in-
terest, or grievousness of the loss, was significant only in the second
stage of a bifurcated analysis. From the outset, then, the Court's
new due process theory seemed to acknowiedge the possibility that
an individual might suffer a grievous loss due to arbitrary govern-
ment action but, because his interest failed to satisfy the threshold
definition of liberty or property, have no right to procedural due
process.
2 7
Decided on the same day as, and cited by, the Roth opinion,
2 8
Morrissey v. Brewer was one of the first Supreme Court decisions ex-
panding prisoners' due process rights.29 Morrissey addressed whether
the conditional freedom a prisoner received from a state-authorized
parole program could be revoked without due process.3 0 For the first
time the Supreme Court found a liberty interest that arose "neither
on constitutional nor on common law claims of right but only on a
state-fostered (and hence justifiable) expectation."3 1 The Morrissey
opinion articulated two distinct lines of reasoning to support a pris-
oner's due process claim. First, because the right at issue would not
27 Herman, supra note 9, at 491-92 (citations omitted).
28 Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71.
29 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
30 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
31 TRiBE, supra note 9, § 10-9, at 686; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. The Court's analysis of
whether a liberty interest existed in the prisoner's right to parole became the only citation
to support the Court's first movement towards a positivist approach to procedural due
process in Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 (decided the same day as Morrissey); see Rubin, supra note 6,
at 1066. But see Herman, supra note 9, at 505 (arguing that Morrissey showed little concern
with the content of state law).
Subsequent, possibly revisionist, Supreme Court precedent concerning parole rights,
indicates that the right in Morrissey arose from the state's statutorily authorized granting of
parole. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1 (1979), the Court held that the mere fact that a state created a parole system and
established a right to fair procedures in the initial parole hearing did not create a liberty
interest. Id. at 9-11. The two cases address benefits that are only subtly different: the grant-
ing of parole (Greenholtz) and the revocation of granted parole (Morrissey). Both deal with
the conditional freedom from prison. Nevertheless, the "implicit promise" that parole
would not be revoked unless the prisoner's conduct did not comport with the conditions
of parole motivated the Court in Monissey. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Unlike its decision in
Morrissey, the Greenholtz Court did not find an implied promise in parole release decisions.
The fine line-drawing of the Morrissey/Greenholtz distinction illustrates the arbitrary nature
of the Court's state-authorization approach and the irrelevance of individual harm to the
inquiry.
[Vol. 81:744
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have existed except for a state's initiative, Morrissey marked the first
occasion where the Court recognized a state-authorized liberty inter-
est in the prison context.3 2 At the same time, the Court recognized a
residuum of prisoners' constitutionally protected liberty. As the Court
observed,
the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of
the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a
"grievous loss" on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly use-
ful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether
the parolee's liberty is a "right" or a "privilege." By whatever name,
the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly
process, however informal.33
The Court concluded by holding that due process required proce-
dural safegnards,34 although less than those required to obtain an ini-
tial conviction, before parole could be revoked. Although the state
was not required to provide parole programs, once it did, due process
safeguarded its arbitrary removal.3
5
Morrissey simultaneously signalled the end of one wooden ap-
proach to prisoners' due process and the beginning of another. The
Court's recognition of a liberty interest in Morrissey was motivated by
the "grievous harm" inflicted on the prisoner. However, the Morrissey
Court's reliance on sub-constitutional positive law sources became a
shortcut, repeatedly utilized until Conner, for finding liberty interests
without giving content to the Due Process Clause itself.3 6
32 The term "state authorization" indicates situations where the Court bases its liberty
interests analysis solely on whether the language of a positive source of law creates a right.
3 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
34 Morrissey requires the following safeguards during a parole revocation hearing.
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically
finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and de-
tached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
408 U.S. at 489. These procedures fall short of the full trial-type procedures held necessary
in Godberg. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
35 TRIBE, supra note 9, § 10-9, at 688.
36 Ironically, the Morrissey fact pattern, where state positive-law sources created a pris-
oner's interest in the ultimate release from incarceration, appears to be one of the few
situations that will satisfy the Conner decision's new "atypicality" threshold. See discussion
infra part l.B.2.
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B. State-Authorization: The Supreme Court's Positivist
Approach to Prisoners' Procedural Due Process
1. Wolff v. McDonnell
Wolff v. McDonnell represents the high-water mark of Supreme
Court jurisprudence concerning the procedural due process rights of
prisoners.3 7 In Wolff, the Supreme Court established the minimum
due process rights guaranteed to a prisoner in a disciplinary hearing
before statutorily authorized good-time credits could be withdrawn.
38
As in Morrissey, the liberty interest in Wolff stemmed from a state posi-
tive-law source and its relation to the timing of a prisoner's ultimate
liberation. 39 As the Wolff Court noted,
the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit... But
here the State itself has not only provided a statutory right to good
time but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for serious mis-
behavior.... [T]he prisoner's interest has real substance and is
sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to
entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the
circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure
that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.4°
Although the Court, in dicta, did recognize that prisoners should have
similar protections in disciplinary hearings resulting in punitive con-
finement,4' the Court's due process analysis, until Conner, focused on
preventing "arbitrary abrogations" of state created rights by prison
officials. 42
After Woff, at least in the prison context,43 the Court shifted its
liberty interest analysis to a positivist approach matching its property
37 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
38 Id. at 554-55. Good-time credits, where authorized by state statute, are dispensed to
prisoners as a reward for good behavior. They are created as "days" off of a prisoner's
sentence. They are usually rewarded on an escalating scale, where the amount dispensed
increase with higher amounts already received. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 1011 n.21.
39 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. See also TRiBE, supra note 9, § 10-9, at 688 (stating that Wolff
held that "when a state chooses to offer prisoners a shortened jail sentence by permitting
the accumulation of credits for good behavior, the revocation of a prisoner's 'good-time'
credits as a punishment for misconduct is valid only if carried out in a manner satisfying
the obligations of procedural due process.").
40 Woff, 418 U.S. at 557 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 571 n.19 (emphasis added); see infra part HID (discussing Wolffs footnote
19).
42 See Herman, supra note 9, at 499-501 (1984) (detailing and criticizing the move-
ment of the Court towards positivism in its prisoner liberty rights decisions); see also Rubin,
supra note 6, at 1073 ("The case that initiated the movement toward a positive law defini-
tion of 'liberty' was probably Wolffv. McDonnell.... ."). See infra part III.B; see also TRiBE,
supra note 9, § 10-10, at 697-98.
43 Professor Herman suggests that the positivist approach to liberty rights is generally
limited to prisoners' rights cases. This phenomenon may result because normally patently
unconstitutional deprivations of liberty, such as confinement in ajail, are basic elements of
[Vol. 81:744
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interest jurisprudence." Following Wolff the Court, rather than in-
voking the Due Process Clause to create some sort of federal standard
of rights, instead used it merely to insure the fair administration of
existing state laws. This positivist approach, in which the magnitude
of harm experienced by the individual is irrelevant in the liberty inter-
est inquiry, came to its fullest fruition in Meachum v. Fano.45
2. Meachum v. Fano: The Removal of the Individual Interest from
the Libeny Interest Analysis
The paradigmatic example of the Supreme Court's state-authori-
zation approach to prisoners' liberty interests was Meachum v. Fano. In
Meachum, the Court found that any interest a prisoner had in being
transferred from a medium-security facility to a maximum-security fa-
cility did not merit procedural protection under the Due Process
Clause.46 The Court reasoned that because the relevant regulations
did not include sufficiently mandatory language constraining official
discretion, the prison officials were free to transfer prisoners even if
the transfer resulted in a substantial adverse impact.47 Accordingly,
the Court refused to require Woff type safeguards for prison transfers
under the Massachusetts regulatory scheme.
48
The Meachum Court harmonized its decision with Wolff on the
grounds that the "liberty interest protected in Wolff had its roots in
a prison sentence and allowable by virtue of a lawful conviction. As Professor Herman
explains:
It is only in circumstances where the state has the acknowledged substantive
power to deprive an individual of a freedom we might recognize as "liberty"
that procedural issues arise. For this reason, cases involving prisoners are
the primary forum for discussion of procedural due process protection of
liberty interests. With respect to prisoners, the state is generally acknowl-
edged to have not only the power to restrict the forms of freedom listed
above, but power over the quintessential freedom-freedom from physical
restraint.
Herman, supra note 9, at 503 (footnote omitted).
44 Id. at 488-500. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (finding property rights
of a student suspended from high school depended on the Court's analysis of state statu-
tory scheme while a liberty interest was found with no reference to authorizing state law).
45 427 U.S. 215 (1976). Professor Herman places enough import in Meachum's treat-
ment of prisoners' liberty interest that she refers to it as "the Meachum doctrine." Herman,
supra note 9, at 523.
46 Meachurm, 427 U.S. at 22--24. See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 10-10, at 694-95; see also
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983) (extending Meachum to interstate pris-
oner transfer even if it involves the inconvenience of great distance or an ocean crossing).
47 Meachurm, 427 U.S. at 225 ("That life in one prison is much more disagreeable than
in another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is impli-
cated when a prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe rules.").
48 Id. The Court rejected the notion that any substantial deprivation imposed by
prison authorities triggers procedural due process protection, on the grounds that it would
make the federal courts arbiter of a wide variety of discretionary decisions that have tradi-
tionally and correctly been in the purview of prison administrators. Id. at 224-25 (citing
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
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state law."49 The Court reasoned by virtue of the prisoner's lawful
conviction that prison administrators possessed the ability to adversely
affect the prisoner's living conditions.50 Convicted after a fair trial,
"the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his lib-
erty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to
the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement
do not otherwise violate the Constitution."51 Under Meachum's strict
requirements, by constructing statutes conferring broad decisionmak-
ing discretion on officials, a state "may eliminate any liberty interest,
and thus escape any minimum procedures requirement, by statutory
negation or by not specifying positive criteria for decision."52 Thus, as
long as the officials avoided trenching on interests protected directly
by another constitutional provision (such as the First or Eighth
Amendments to the Constitution), any quantum of harm was permis-
sible as long as the state legislature had the foresight to draft vague
regulations that avoided cabining the discretion of prison officials.
Despite its explicit disregard of the prisoners' interest in the lib-
erty analysis, Meachum's approach of requiring entitlements created by
local positive law sources became the linchpin of the Court's liberty
interest jurisprudence. As Professor Cynthia R. Farina describes,
"once entitlement analysis became available as a way to think about
liberty as well as property interests, its power as an analytic framework
was almost irresistible."55 However, the entitlements analysis had seri-
ous flaws. Under a strict entitlements analysis, a prisoner could invoke
due process protections on relatively insignificant matters of prison
regulation so long as the regulatory language limiting the prison offi-
cials' discretion was mandatory. Because, under Meachum's approach,
49 Id. at 226. This analysis is applicable to the issue that was in front of the Wolffcourt,
namely good-time credits, which were statutorily authorized. However, this does not ex-
tend to the protection necessary before imposing punitive confinement. See Herman, supra
note 9, at 510-11.
50 The Meachum Court stated:
[Als we have said.., prison officials [under the applicable state statutes]
have the discretion to transfer prisoners for any number of reasons. Their
discretion is not limited to instances of serious misconduct. As we under-
stand it no legal interest or right of these respondents ... would have been
violated by their transfer whether or not their misconduct had been proved
in accordance with procedures that might be required by the Due Process
Clause in other circumstances. Whatever expectation the prisoner may
have in remaining at a particular prison so long as he behaves himself, it is
too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protec-
tions ....
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228.
51 Id. at 224. Such "other" violations of the Constitution recognized by the Court in
the prison context include the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth (Equal Protection Clause)
Amendments. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 n.1l (1995).
52 Rubin, supra note 6, at 1076; see also Tribe, supra note 9, § 10-10, at 695-97 (discuss-
ing the Court's unwillingness to extend liberty entitlements).
53 Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALEJ. L. & FEMINISM 188, 193 (1991).
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the severity of harm was irrelevant to the due process analysis, 54 courts
were drawn into day-to-day management of prisons under the rubric
of due process.55 In response, the Supreme Court in Kentucky Depart-
ment of Corrections v. Thompson56 restricted the range of language that,
through the state-authorization approach, could implicate due pro-
cess concerns.. The Thompson decision foreshadowed Conne-s narrow-
ing of the state-authorization approach, the linchpin of the prisoner
due process inquiry, by looking to the character of harm inflicted
before the state-authorization approach can apply.
3. Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson
By the time the Court handed down the Thompson opinion, the"
state-authorization approach had backfired. Although it had initially
allowed the Court to avoid opening a Pandora's box of new rights
through direct interpretations of the Due Process Clause in early cases
like Roth and Wolff it also caused the courts to become inundated with
section 1983 suits filed by prisoners claiming that statutory and regula-
tory language, addressing seemingly unimportant issues, had created
liberty interests.57 The Thompson Court responded by heightening the
mandatory language requirement for invoking a positive-law source
for a liberty interest.
Thompson involved state and prison regulations that permitted
prison officials to refuse to allow certain personal visitation rights to
prisoners. The relevant statute enumerated a non-exhaustive list of
situations where visitation privileges might be restricted.58 Thus,
under the Meachum approach, the Court should have found that the
prison officials could not deny visitation privileges without some pro-
cess. The Court, however, disagreed.
Although the Thompson Court did find that the underlying statu-
tory language did create "substantive predicates" to guide the deci-
sionmaker that had previously been sufficient to give rise to a liberty
interest, the Court held that the language at issue did not satisfy the
54 See, e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989). As
the Thompson majority observed:
The fact that certain state-created liberty interests have been found to be
entitled to due process protection, while others have not, is not the result of
this Court's judgment as to what interests are more significant than others;
rather, our method of inquiry in these cases always has been to examine
closely the language of the relevant statutes and regulations.
Id.
55 See Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2298 (state-authorization approach no longer required
showing of "grievous loss").
56 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
57 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
58 Thompson, 490 U.S. at 457 n.1 (quoting Commonwealth of Kentucky Corrections
Policies and Procedures § 403.06 (1981)).
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heightened standard necessary to implicate the Due Process Clause. 59
Under this newly heightened standard, in order to create a legitimate
prisoner interest, the statutory language must have contained "rele-
vant mandatory language that expressly requires the decisionmaker to apply
certain substantive predicates in determining whether an inmate may
be deprived of the particular interest in question." 60
The Thompson decision was the Supreme Court's last word on the
state-authorization approach prior to its decision in Conner. The
Court recognized that its dependence on state positivist language had
drawn the due process analysis away from focusing on the harm in-
flicted on the individual, and instead required federal courts to re-
peatedly sift through broad regulatory schemes for finite language
intended to guide prison officials rather than to create enforceable
prisoner rights. 61 The logical alternative was to limit the relevance of
statutory language to the due process analysis and instead look to the
interest of the individual. Although the Court consistently maintains
that due process interests "may arise from two sources-the Due Process
Clause itself and the laws of the States,"62 the Court's interpretations of
the Due Process Clause under the state-authorization doctrine seri-
ously undermine the contention that prisoners can receive due pro-
cess protections for many serious interests without relying on the state-
authorization process.
C. The Supreme Court's post-Wolff Invocation of the Due
Process Clause Itself as an Origin of Prisoners'
Liberty Interests
As previously described, after Wolff the Supreme Court's prison-
ers' liberty interest analysis largely focused on the existence of positiv-
ist sources of state law to create liberty interests protected by due
process. 63 Under Meachum, a "grievous harm" or a "substantial depri-
vation" alone was, in the Court's analysis, insufficient to trigger due
process protection.6 4 Prisoners attempting to directly invoke the Due
Process Clause had to show that their confinement was so irregular
that the "conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner
[was] subjected [were not] within the sentence imposed upon him."65 This
has proved a difficult burden.
59 Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463-65.
60 Thompson, 490 U.S. at 464 n.4 (emphasis added).
61 See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299-2300 (1995).
62 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983) (emphasis added).
653 See supra part I.B.
64 See, e.g., Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224
(1976)).
65 Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (emphasis added); see Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (no process due if deprivation "is well within the terms of
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There are only two post-Wolff decisions in which claimants satis-
fied the "within the sentence" test and got the Court to enunciate
liberty interests originating in the Due Process Clause itself. These
cases are Vitek v. Jones66 and Washington v. Harper.67 In both cases,
however, the Supreme Court preceded its discussion of the Due Pro-
cess Clause's direct invocation with extensive discussions of proce-
dural due process protections required by the state-authorization
approach. 6
8
In Vitek, the Court found that a Nebraska state prisoner had a
liberty interest rooted in state law against being transferred involunta-
rily to a mental hospital. After finding an interest worthy of protec-
tion under the state-authorization approach, the Court went on to
find that the Due Process Clause itself required procedures before
such a transfer could occur. The Court found that the additional re-
strictions on the prisoner's containment coupled with the "stigma-
tizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital" infringed the
residuum of liberty, recognized in Morrissey, that the prisoner retained
subsequent to a lawful conviction.69 The Court explained that such
an imposition "visited on the prisoner [is] qualitatively different from
confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence."); see also Thompson, 490 U.S. at
460-61 (citing Hewitt and Meachum).
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Thompson criticized the "within the sentence" ap-
proach to direct interpretations of the Due Process Clause. He referred to the test as
vague because "a typical prison sentence says little more than that the defendant must
spend a specified period of time behind bars.... [I]n practice this [standard] crystallizes
only on those infrequent occasions when a majority of the Court happens to say so." Id. at
466-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
As discussed below, see infra part Ill, the Conner decision's "atypicality" standard ap-
pears to implement the same character of vague, restrictive standards as a threshold to
rights authorized "by the laws of the States." This added threshold makes sense as a barrier
to invoking state positive law as a source of interests worthy of protection because such
sources are often intended merely to provide guidance rather than mandate conduct.
However, this Note argues that the limitation of the state-authorization approach necessi-
tates that the "within the sentence" test should no longer pose a barrier to direct readings
of the Due Process Clause itself. The Court, before Conner, had used the state-authoriza-
tion approach as a vehicle to provide due process protection without engaging in the diffi-
cult task of directly interpreting the Due Process Clause. Now that it has abandoned this
crutch, the Court must retool its due process inquiries to focus on the "grievous loss" in-
flicted on individual prisoners regardless of whether the character of the harm is one that
is possibly conceivable under the "within the sentence" standard.
66 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
67 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
68 Harper, 494 U.S. at 219-21; Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488-90. See also Farina, supra note 53, at
193 n.19 (noting that in both Vitek and Harper the Court "first identifies in detail a state law
liberty entitlement" before adding "a cursory assurance that the Due Process Clause itself
also generates a liberty interest.").
69 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491-94. The Court took specific notice in this discussion that the
prisoner had been convicted of robbery. Id. at 491. The Court does not refer to the char-
acter of the offense or the duration of the sentence as relevant to its analysis under the Due
Process Clause. However, as discussed infra note 124 and accompanying text, the Conner
Court took specific notice of Conner's underlying offenses and the duration of his sen-
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the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of
crime."
70
Harper, like Vitek, involved treatment of prisoners for mental ill-
ness. Harper dealt with the administration of antipsychotic medica-
tion. The Harper Court began its analysis by finding that the relevant
state law "undoubtedly confer[red] . . . a right to be free from the
arbitrary administration of antipsychotic medication." 71 Although the
Court found that Harper had a liberty interest created by state law, the
Court found that the procedures prescribed by that law were sufficient
and complied with in the instant case.72 The Court continued its anal-
ysis by stating "[w] e have no doubt that, in addition to the liberty inter-
est created by the State's Policy, [Harper] possesses a significant
liberty interest ... under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."73 However, the Court found that "the Due Process
Clause confers upon respondent no greater right than that recog-
nized under state law."74 Thus, Harper had received all the process
due.
In determining that Harper had a liberty interest cognizable
under both the state-authorization approach and the Due Process
Clause itself but which did not require any procedural protections be-
yond those prescribed by the state law, the Court evaluated the pris-
oner's right "in the context of the inmate's confinement."75 The
Court determined that the state's statutorily prescribed procedures
properly recognized "both the prisoner's medical interests and the
State's interests, [thus] meet[ing] the demands of the Due Process
Clause."7
6
Thus, in both instances where the Court read the Due Process
Clause itself as requiring procedural protections in the prison context,
it did so while relying heavily on a state-authorization analysis. In both
Vitek and Harper, the deprivations at issue were related to mental
tence in its analysis. It is an open question whether due process varies by duration of
sentence and character of underlying offenses.
70 Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added). As discussed infra part III.C, the applica-
tion of a true "qualitatively different" standard might aid the Court in its evaluation of
prisoner deprivations under the Due Process Clause.
71 Harper, 494 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added) (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
471-72 (1983)).
72 Id. at 221-22.
73 Id. at 221.
74 Id. at 222.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 222-23. Upon finding a liberty interest worthy of protection, the HarperCourt
concentrated on the evaluation of the constitutionality of the state regulations. See id. at
223-28. Because this Note argues that liberty interests should largely be grounded in the
inherent liberty of the individual independent of the existence of state regulations, this




health. Further, the Court reserved direct readings of the Due Pro-
cess Clause to those instances it deemed inherently unrelated to regu-
larly imposed penal confinement. For more ordinary punishments,
such as disciplinary confinement and disciplinary revocation of privi-
leges, the Court has refused to rely directly on the Due Process Clause
and instead has relied on the state-authorization approach. No deci-
sion of the Court suggests that, in the absence of a state-authorization
approach, prisoners would be able to invoke due process protection
for even extreme or arbitrary deprivations of these rights because such
deprivations, in the Court's view, are "well within the terms of confine-
ment ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence."77 Under this
framework, Conners drastic limitation of the state-authorization ap-
proach may exact dramatic and inherently unjust consequences on
prisoners' rights.
D. Summary of General Overview
The Court's approach to procedural due process was transformed
during the 1970s.78 The Court's early approach, reaching its pinnacle
in Goldberg, found interests protected by due process through a bal-
ancing of individual and state interests. This balancing approach
could create interests based solely on the degree of potential harm to
an individual's interests. 79 This expansive approach invited a flood of
litigation which prompted the Court to shift to a positivist methodol-
ogy. Under this new positivist approach, grievous harm alone no
longer implicated the Due Process Clause. Instead, a person seeking
due process protection had to show a "mutually explicit understand-
ing" to support a liberty or property right °80 The most commonly rec-
ognized source of these understandings was the positive-law embodied
in state enactments. 81
Although the positivist approach allowed federal due process
guarantees to vary depending on a particular state's law, the Court,
following Wolff repeatedly applied it to prisoner due process issues.
In Thompson, the Court responded to the flood of challenged state
statutes and regulations by restricting the type of language that could
create the "understanding" necessary to invoke due process protec-
tion. The Court strayed from the state-authorization approach to find
protected interests in the Due Process Clause itself in only a few ex-
77 Hewittv. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983); see also Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460-462 (1989) (detailing the limited direct readings of the Due
Process Clause that the Court has been willing to undertake and the interest-neutral nature
of the state-authorization approach).
78 See supra part IA
79 See supra part IA
80 See supra part I.C.
81 See supra part I.C.
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treme instances. Even in these limited instances, the Court found a
concurrent state-authorized liberty interest before commencing a Due
Process Clause analysis. 82 Thus, the Court avoided creating a body of
law whose due process vitality drew its origin from the Due Process
Clause itself by instead reviewing state positive law sources. The Con-
ner decision, which dramatically limits the applicability of the state-
authorization approach, potentially leaves prisoners without any
source of viable precedent to draw upon in making a due process
claim against prison officials.
II
SANDIN V. CONNER
A. Facts and Procedural Background
The facts surrounding Conner's section 1983 claim provided the
Supreme Court with an ideal opportunity to overturn nearly twenty
years of unquestioned precedent that spawned from dictum in Wolff
that recognized a liberty interest, protected by the Due Process
Clause, in a prisoner's right to remain free from punitive confine-
ment.8 3 DeMont Conner was convicted of murder, kidnaping, rob-
bery, and burglary.84 Conner received an indeterminate sentence of
thirty years to life and was housed in Hawaii's Halawa Correctional
Facility, a maximum security state prison.8 5
The relevant incident occurred in August of 1987. Following sub-
jection to a strip search, which included an inspection of the rectal
area, Conner directed angry and foul language at the inspecting
prison officer. Eleven days later, Conner received notice that he had
been charged with disciplinary infractions. The charges included
"'high misconduct' for using physical interference to impair a correc-
82 Id.
83 Even both dissenting opinions take the position that Conner in this instance did
not appear to be denied the process that was due. The only right under Wolff denied to
Conner was the qualified right to call witnesses. As discussed infra text accompanying
notes 214-17, a call for witnesses may be properly refused when the projected testimony is
not relevant to the matter in controversy. This was the factual determination made by the
district court. See Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Additionally,
Conner himself, upon being released from punitive confinement, requested to be put into
protective custody which has some similarities to the conditions of punitive confinement.
The majority noted this fact in its holding. See infra note 124.
84 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2295. As discussed infra, the Connermajority may have weighed
the character of Conner's original sentence in evaluating his due process interests. Such
an analysis places too many variables in the due process calculus. This Note argues, infra
part III.B, that prisoners' rights should depend on the treatment of prisoners in general,
and not rest on finite distinctions between initial sentences.
85 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2295.
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tional function, and 'low moderate misconduct' for using abusive or
obscene language and for harassing employees."8 6
Conner's disciplinary hearing occurred on August 28, 1987. The
committee refused Conner's request to present witnesses at the hear-
ing. Under Hawaii's disciplinary hearing statutes, a disciplinary com-
mittee is bound to make a finding of guilt if the charge is supported
by "substantial evidence."87 The committee found Conner guilty and
sentenced him to the statutory maximum of thirty days in disciplinary
segregation in the Special Holding Unit for the high misconduct
charge, and four hours segregation for each of the remaining charges,
to be served concurrently with the primary sentence. 88
Conner sought administrative review within fourteen days of the
committee's decision as prescribed by Hawaii's statutes.8 9 Before the
86 Id. at 2295-96.
87 The full text of the pertinent regulation reads:
Upon completion of the hearing, the committee may take the matter under
advisement and render a decision based upon evidence presented at the
hearing to which the individual had an opportunity to respond or any cu-
mulative evidence which may subsequently come to light may be used as a
permissible inference of guilt, although disciplinary action shall be based
upon more than mere silence. A finding of guilt shall be made where: (1)
The inmate or ward admits the violation or pleads guilty. (2) The charge is
supported by substantial evidence.
Haw. Admin. Rule § 17-201-18(b) (2) (1983) (emphasis added). As discussed infra part
Il.B, despite the mandatory character of the regulation's language on this matter, Conner's
holding suggests that prison officials could impose punitive segregated confinement based
on silence alone. Furthermore, a plain reading of Conner's holding indicates that punitive
confinement could be imposed ex parte. Because there is no liberty interest, no process is
due before punishment is imposed.
88 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2296. It is important to note that the maximum sentence was a
finite time. Other states allow infractions classified as "high misconduct" under the Hawaii
statutory scheme to be punished with sentences of a much longer duration. The Court's
opinion does not address this fact. The language of the opinion indicates that duration of
the confinement is irrelevant to the existence of a liberty interest that triggers due process
protection.
This case is also unusual in that the sentencing committee did not remove good-time
credits as part of Conner's sentence. Good-time credit removal usually occurs hand-in-
hand with the imposition of punitive confinement. The absence of good-time credits from
this case enabled the Court to sever the liberty interest created by footnote 19 of Wolff in
disciplinary hearings resulting in punitive confinement, see supra note 39 and accompany-
ing text, from the remainder of the case. As discussed infra, the Court does not address the
problem underlying footnote 19 of the Wolff decision-that the due process required in a
hearing where the issue of whether good-time credits are to be removed can only be de-
cided after the committee finds the prisoner guilty. If the answer is yes, then states will
have to provide due process procedures under Wolffwhenever they anticipate the possibil-
ity of removing good-time credits as a punitive sentence, whether they are ultimately re-
moved or not. Both the imposition of disciplinary confinement and the removal of good-
time credits usually stem from the same disciplinary hearing. Thus, in states that do re-
move good-time credits, some prisoners will receive Wolffrights in hearings that only result
in the imposition of disciplinary confinement. See generally Babcock, supra note 4 (discuss-
ing state regulations that are interpreted as giving rise to Wolff protections).
89 Conner, 115 S. Ct at 2296. See also Haw. Admin. Rule § 17-201-20(a) (1983). As
discussed infra part I.B, the Court has eliminated the liberty interest created by footnote
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deputy administrator could review the guilty finding on the high mis-
conduct charge,90 Conner filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages for, among
other things, a deprivation of procedural due process. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials.91
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court judgment. The court, following Thompson's
reasoning, found that the Hawaii prison regulations created a non-
discretionary duty to refrain from imposing disciplinary confinement
on prisoners without an admission of guilt or presentation of substan-
tial evidence.92 Having found a state-authorized liberty interest in a
disciplinary hearing resulting solely in solitary confinement, the Court
of Appeals held that Conner should have been afforded the pre-depri-
vation procedures enunciated in Wolff.93
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reversed.94 The Court could have reversed the court of
appeals by concluding that the relevant Hawaii regulations did not
satisfy the heightened mandatory language requirement necessary
under Thompson to create a liberty interest.95 However, the Court in-
stead chose to eliminate the issue at hand by vastly narrowing the
availability of the state-authorization approach, which had served as
the core of prisoner due process for the prior twenty years.
19 of the Wolff decision. If, however, this result is overturned in the future, it is an open
question what curative effects a timely administrative review would have on a prisoner's
post-deprivation section 1983 suit. See, e.g., Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 660 (1994) (Ma-
honey, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a timely post-deprivation administrative review
should, as sound public policy, be construed as eliminating an injury for the purpose of
section 1983 suits).
90 "iT]he deputy administrator found the high misconduct change unsupported and
expunged Conner's disciplinary record with respect to that charge." Conner, 115 S. Ct. at
2296. However, the appeal occurred nine months after the initial appeal and well after
Conner had completed his 30 day maximum sentence in punitive confinement. Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 2296-97.
93 Id. at 2297; see also supra part I.B.1.
94 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the majority opinion.
There were two separate dissents. One was byJustice Ginsburg withJustice Stevens joining.
The other was by Justice Breyer withJustice Souterjoining.
95 The court of appeals drew a negative inference from the language that stated "dis-
ciplinary action sha/l be based upon more than mere silence. A finding of guilt shall be
made where: (1) The inmate or ward admits the violation or pleads guilty. (2) The
charge is supported by substantial evidence." Haw. Admin. Rule § 17-201-18(b) (2) (1983)
(emphasis added). Under a strict state-authorization reading, the only right apparently
created is the right against imposition of punishment for mere silence. The two enumer-
ated reasons that follow could be construed as requiring punishment when present, but
not as necessary elements for punishment. In other words, the statute does not address the
issue of whether punishment can-be imposed on evidence that falls somewhere between
silence and substantial evidence.
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B. 'Majority's Analysis: The Evisceration of the
State-Authorization Approach
1. Treatment of Prior Precedent
The Court conducted a review of the state-authorization ap-
proach's history in the context of prison liberty interests. Its analysis
began with Wolff v. McDonnelL The Court described Wolff s recogni-
tion of a prisoner's entitlement to state-authorized good-time credits
as grounded in the fact that the interest was one of "'real sub-
stance."' 96 The Court next discussed Meachum,97 which it described as
providing a fuller treatment of liberty interests than Wooff The Court
noted that dicta from Meachum enhanced the primacy of state law in
the due process inquiry. The Court elaborated, saying that "by focus-
ing on whether state action was mandatory or discretionary, the Court
in later cases [put] ever greater emphasis on this somewhat mechani-
cal dichotomy."98 The Court described the transformation of this di-
chotomy into practice as coming to "full fruition" in Hewitt v. Helms.99
In Hewitt, the Court found that Pennsylvania prison regulations
had mandatory predicates sufficient to create a liberty interest in a
prisoner's right to remain free from administrative process. 100 The
Conner majority began its discussion of Hewitt by reiterating its rejec-
tion of an inmate's right to stay within the general prison population
under the Due Process Clause as applied through the "within the sen-
tence" standard discussed in Thompson.101 The Connermajority identi-
fied Hewitt as the point at which the state-authorization approach
derailed:
Instead of looking to whether the State created an interest of "real
substancd' comparable to the good time credit scheme of Wolff the
96 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2297 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. at 557 (1976)) (emphasis added). The Conner Court characterized as dicta lan-
guage in Wolffthat, in a footnote, authorized procedural due process protection for disci-
plinary hearings resulting in disciplinary confinement. Conner 115 S. Ct at 2301; Wolff
418 U.S. at 571 n.19; see also discussion infra part III.D.
97 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
98 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2298.
99 Id. The Court first addressed Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Greenholtz involved a discretionary parole scheme where a
state statute set discretionary parole dates at the time of the minimum term of imprison-
ment, minus any expired good-time credits. The statute ordered release of prisoners un-
less one of four specific conditions were shown. Id. at 11. The Greenholtz majority,
according to the Conner opinion, "accepted the inmates' argument that the word 'shall' in
the statute created a legitimate expectation of release absent the requisite finding that one
of the justifications for deferral existed." Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2298.
100 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983). Justice Stevens, in dissent, criticized the majority's dis-
missal of the harm inflicted as irrelevant to the liberty interest analysis. Id. at 482 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
101 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2298; see supra part I.B.3 (discussing Thompson's treatment of
Hewitt's "within the sentence imposed" standard).
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[Hewitt] Court asked whether the State had gone beyond issuing
mere procedural guidelines and had used "language of an unmis-
takably mandatory character" such that the incursion on liberty
would not occur "absent specified substantive predicates."
0 2
The Court criticized the state-authorization approach's application,
after Hewitt, as no longer hinging procedural due process rights on a
showing of a "'grievous loss'."103 The Conner majority noted that this
predicament has forced courts to wrestle "with the language of intri-
cate, often rather routine prison guidelines to determine whether
mandatory language and substantive predicates created an enforcea-
ble expectation that the state would produce a particular outcome
with respect to the prisoner's conditions of confinement." 0 4 As a re-
sult, prisoners were "encouraged... to comb regulations in search of
mandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-
conferred privileges." 10 5
The Court noted that the state-authorization approach as applied
in Hewitt confused the lower courts and caused them to draw "nega-
tive inferences from the mandatory language in the text of prison reg-
ulations."' 0 6 Although the Court conceded that such interpretative
methods "may be entirely sensible in the ordinary task of construing a
statute defining rights and remedies available to the general pub-
lic,"10 7 it distinguished prison regulations by stating that they are "pri-
marily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of
a prison."'0 8 The Court noted that the state-authorization approach
to prisoner liberty-interest jurisprudence was particularly onerous in
light of its use in negative-implication jurisprudence where the liberty
interest depends on statutory authorization, but the procedures due
are determined independently by the courts. 10 9
The Court next identified two undesirable effects produced by
Hewitts removal of a grievous harm requirement from the creation of
102 Conner, 115 S. C. at 2298 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72).
103 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2298 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
104 Id. The Court cited Ohm and Thompson as specific examples of what it considered a
misguided state-authorization approach. Id. at 2299.




109 Id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (describing 3-step balancing
procedure to determine what process is due under the Due Process Clause once a liberty
or property interest has been identified). This portion of the opinion may be a subtle
revival ofJustice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
In that case, Justice Rehnquist argued that if the origin of a liberty or property interest
originates from a statutory scheme, then the process due should also be drawn from that
statute. This so-called "bitter with the sweet" approach was never adopted by a majority of
the Court.
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due process interests."10 The first danger purportedly created by the
state-authorization approach was that it discouraged states from codi-
fying prison management procedures in the interest of uniform treat-
ment."'1 As the majority theorized, "States may avoid creation of
'liberty' interests by having scarcely any regulations, or by conferring
standardless discretion on correctional personnel.""12  1,
The second danger that the Court saw as stemming from Hewitt's
approach was the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day man-
agement of prisons.113 The Conner majority observed that the state-
authorization approach, relying on mandatory language in state stat-
utes and regulations as the primary source of protected liberty inter-
ests, had drawn the federal courts into the management of minute
and seemingly insignificant issues of prison life."14 In light of these
concerns, the Court prescribed a new foundational requirement to be
met before state positive-law sources may give rise to interests requir-
ing due process protections.
2. The Addition of the "Atypicality" Foundational Requirement to the
State-Authorization Approach
The Court's new positivist approach to defining prisoner liberty
interests began with a call to return to the precepts forwarded in Wolff
and Meachum. 15 Retaining some portion of the state-authorization
110 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2299-2300.
111 There is some sense to this notion. Commentators from all sides have criticized the
state-authorization approach. See Herman, supra note 9, at 528-74; Rubin, supra note 6, at
1082-1131. However, the Court's decision to virtually abandon looking to positive-law
sources for liberty interests leaves two basic alternatives. The first is to recognize that the
Court is unwilling to intrude, to any meaningful extent, on prison administration in order
to find due process rights. The second is to recognize that the prisoner's retained liberty
has substantive meaning and to recognize rights originating from the Due Process Clause
itself. This is the approach taken by the dissenting justices in Conner, see infra part II.C.1 &
2, and is eloquently described by Justice Marshall in his dissent to Thompson, see infra part
Ill.B.
112 Conner, 115 S. Ct at 2299. The Court's concern with the State's ability to displace
liberty interests seems misplaced here because its ultimate holding still allows state-authori-
zation, but merely imposes an additional "atypical" harm requirement.
113 Id.; see also Hewit 459 U.S. at 470-71; Woff, 418 U.S. at 561-63.
114 Conner, 115 S. C. at 2299-2300 (providing a shopping list of cases where the federal
courts have been drawn into day-to-day prison management under the guise of the Due
Process Clause because of mandatory state regulatory language).
115 Id. at 2300. The Court noted that its abandonment of "Hewitt's methodology" did
not "technically" overrule any of its prior holdings. The Court specifically noted that in
Wakinekona and Thompson it did not find a liberty interest, and in Hewitt the Court deter-
mined that the prisoner had received all the process due. Id. at n.5. The dictum of Wolffs
footnote 19 notwithstanding, this contention seems a little misguided given that the issues
were decided on a state-authorization basis. The Court never reached a pure Due Process
inquiry in those cases. It does seem clear, however, under Connes heightened standard
combined with the Court's past rejections of rights emanating from the Due Process
Clause itself, that the present Court would not have found a liberty interest in any of those
cases.
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approach, the Court recognized that "States may under certain cir-
cumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due
Process Clause."" 6 However, the Court noted that these instances
were generally limited to "freedom from restraint, which, while not
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise
to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life."
117
The Court rejected Conner's assertion that "any state action
taken for a punitive reason encroaches upon a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause even in the absence of a state regulation."1 8
Reiterating its boilerplate language from previous decisions that pris-
oners do not sacrifice all constitutional privileges at the prison gate,
but do suffer a retraction of such benefits " justified by the considera-
tions underlying our penal system,' "119 the Court rejected Conner's
claim because his punitive confinement "did not present the type of
atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably cre-
ate a liberty interest." 20 The Court offered no citation or example of
what an "atypical, significant deprivation" or the "ordinary incidents
116 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987)).
117 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (involving transfer
to mental institution); Washington v. Lee, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that independent
of any state-authorized interest, prisoner had interest in remaining free of involuntary ad-
ministration of psychotropic drugs)). This approach was argued before, but not decided
by the Court, in Thompson. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461
n.3 (1989).
Thus, under the Court's analysis, there are two ways in which the prisoner can suggest
that a liberty interest exists. The first is a state-authorized right, generally limited from
freedom from "restraint," that it is so unexpected that it is not within the sentence im-
posed. The second stems from the Due Process Clause itself. Regarding the first avenue,
as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Thompson, see infra note 162 and accompanying
text, the "within the sentence" standard is so vague that if broadly construed, it gives the
Court free-wheeling discretion to find or deny liberty interests without any analysis of the
degree of loss to the prisoner or the arbitrariness of the treatment. The "freedom from
restraint" line that the Conner Court draws seems to bearjustice Marshall's fears out. As to
the second avenue, the Court, while recognizing a residuum of liberty that a prisoner re-
tains upon entering prison, see supra note 88, has yet to identify a situation where it is
implicated.
118 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 (emphasis added). The Court refused this contention as
a flat rule. What the Court does not address is whether the punitive character of a depriva-
tion has any effect on the liberty interest calculus. As discussed infra part IIl.D, an ap-
proach that would take into account the degree of harm and whether it has the effect of
stigmatizing the prisoner by singling him out for punishment should affect the due process
analysis. In such an analysis, state statutes or regulations would be relevant to determining
the arbitrariness of the action or the amount of stigma that results, but would neither be a
necessary nor determinative factor.
119 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2301 (quotingJones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union,
433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948))).
120 Id. at 2301 (emphasis added).
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of prison life" might entail. 12' However, the Court's analysis of Con-
ner's claim indicated that it would not look to state law to implicate
due process concems unless the deprivation at issue is so uncharacter-
istic that it is beyond what a prisoner would expect upon being sen-
tenced to prison. The degree of harm or arbitrariness of treatment,
considered irrelevant by Meachum,' 22 remained outside of the Court's
analysis under the "atypicality" standard because that standard looks
to the general character of the confinement rather than to any detri-
mental effects of individual applications.' 23 Thus, as long as a punish-
ment is constitutionally permissible in some circumstances, the
irrationality or arbitrariness of a specific application appdars irrele-
vant under an atypicality analysis.
The Court examined Hawaii's confinement regulatory scheme in
its entirety in determining that Conner's confinement did not satisfy
this new "atypicality" standard. The majority observed, "at the time of
Conner's punishment, disciplinary segregation, with insignificant excep-
tions, mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administra-
tive segregation and protective custody. . . . Thus, Conner's
confinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary confine-
ment in either duration or degree of restriction."' 2 4 Under this analy-
sis, the Court concluded that the conditions of Conner's confinement
were not so "atypical" as to create a liberty interest. 25 Having deter-
121 Although the Court does not cite any case in support of its new "atypicality" stan-
dard, it appears to draw upon the "within the sentence" standard from Montayne, relied
upon by the majority in Thompson, see supra note 65. As argued infra, the vagueness of
initial convictions should render them inadequate as the foundation of procedural due
process interests. If the Court is to give any real meaning to prisoners' procedural due
process, it must look to the individual's interest. Although this is decreased by an initial
conviction, it is not obliterated by it. See discussion infra notes 195-99 and accompanying
text
122 See supra note 54.
123 See discussion supra part I.B.2.
124 Conner, 115 S. Ct at 2301 (emphasis added). The Court did not indicate what
result would be reached if punitive confinement were the only type of segregative confine-
ment authorized. Indeed, the Hawaii administrative confinement regulations had been
repealed by the time the Conner opinion was written. Id. at n.7. If the state segregative
scheme is essential in making a liberty interest determination, then the Court's opinion
seems to leave liberty interests well within the manipulation of state legislators. State legis-
lators, in order to defeat a possible liberty interest in prisoners housed in punitive confine-
ment, could create discretionary administrative confinements that would dilute the
prisoners' interests.
The dissenting opinions, discussed infra part II.C, take issue with the majority's
minimalization of the differences between punitive confinement, segregative confinement,
and protective confinement
125 The Court noted that Conner himself requested that he be placed in protective
custody after he had been released from disciplinary segregation. The Court stated that
although "a prisoner's subjective expectations [are not] dispositive of the liberty analysis, it
does provide some evidence that the conditions suffered were expected within the contour
of the actual sentence imposed." Conner, 115 S. Ct at 2301 n.9. As the dissent argues, see
infra notes 128-29, there is a distinction between protective custody and punitive confine-
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mined that "neither the Hawaii prison regulation in question, nor the
Due Process Clause itself," 26 created any liberty interest, much less
one deserving the protections of Wolff, the Court concluded that the
regime to which Conner was subjected was "within the range of confine-
ment to be normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of
30 years to life."
127
C. The Conner Dissents
1. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, with Justice Stevens joining, dissented from the
majority's holding that the Due Process Clause itself did not provide
Conner a liberty interest meriting Due Process protections. Accord-
ing to Justice Ginsburg, "[d] isciplinary confinement as punishment
for 'high misconduct' not only deprives prisoners of privileges for pro-
tracted periods; unlike administrative segregation and protective cus-
tody, disciplinary confinement also stigmatizes them and diminishes parole
prospects."128 Further, Justice Ginsburg maintained that this stigma-
tizing effect required due process protection. Justice Ginsburg re-
jected the majority's contention that because the State expunged
Conner's record, it removed any long-term consequences that might
have implicated a liberty interest at the initial disciplinary hearing.
Justice Ginsburg reasoned, "One must, of course, know at the start the
character of the interest at stake in order to determine then what pro-
cess, if any, is constitutionally due. 'All's well that ends well' cannot be
the measure here."1
29
Justice Ginsburg completely rejected the state-authorization ap-
proach. She noted that such a practice puts constitutional rights in
ment, and the expungement procedure is irrelevant to the due process analysis. Further-
more, as discussed infra note 200 and accompanying text, hinging an individual's liberty
interest on the entirety of a prison regulation scheme causes the availability of protections
to vary from state-to-state and remain in the purview of the state legislature instead of the
courts.
126 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2302.
127 Id. (emphasis added). This last sentence, as discussed more fully, infra part IIIA,
raises some interesting questions. If a prisoner really expects to spend a thirty day period
in solitary confinement without any pre-deprivation process, when does that expectation
fade? What if the original sentence is only for 30 days and it is spent entirely in solitary
confinement? What if there are consecutive punitive sentences for multiple disciplinary
violations? It seems that, under the Court's reasoning, there could be an endless chain of
arbitrary sentences without any process until the sentences affected the timing of a pris-
oner's ultimate release from prison. This narrow reading of state-authorization, combined
with the high burden placed on prisoners to directly invoke the Due Process Clause, leave
the prisoner without any due process for some potentially serious and stigmatizing depriva-
tions of interests. See infra part III.C.
128 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2302-03 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 234-235 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
129 Id. at 2303 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the hands of-state legislators and encourages vague statutes and regu-
lations designed to avoid constitutional scrutiny, instead of tightly
cabining prison officials' discretion to provide guidance in prison ad-
ministration.130 Justice Ginsburg also criticized the approach as ren-
dering constitutional liberty interests dependent on the strength of a
particular positive law source. She criticized such a result as "not
resembl[ing] the 'Liberty' enshrined among "'unalienable Rights'"
with which all persons are" 'endowed by their Creator.'"131 Justice
Ginsburg questioned whether there could ever be a violation satisfy-
ing the "atypicality" requirement that did not simultaneously violate
the Due Process Clause directly. She noted that the majority offered
no examples where this might occur, and accordingly left "consumers
of the Court's work at sea, unable to fathom what would constitute an
'atypical, significant deprivation,' and yet not trigger protection under
the Due Process Clause." 3 2
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyerjoined by justice Souter, wrote an extensive dissent
disagreeing with the majority's findings on both the state-authoriza-
tion approach, and stressing the importance of preventing arbitrary,
punitive confinements which, he argued, should trigger inherent pro-
tections from the Due Process Clause itself.
a. Justice Breyer's Disagreement with the Conner
Majo0ity's Holding
Justice Breyer began his dissent by reviewing the Court's previous
two-pronged approach to prison liberty analysis. As he recounted,
"this Court traditionally has looked either (1) to the nature of the
deprivation (how severe, in degree or kind) or (2) to the State's rules
governing the imposition of that deprivation (whether they, in effect,
give the inmate a 'right' to avoid it)."'33 On the Conner facts, Justice
Breyer believed a liberty interest existed under both prongs.
Justice Breyer determined that under existing precedent, Con-
ner's confinement represented a "fairly majQr change" in Conner's
conditions and therefore amounted to a deprivation of a constitu-
tional liberty interest irrespective of state law.' 34 However, Justice
130 Id. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (quoting the Declaration of Independence) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) ("'[Tihe Due Process Clause protects [the
unalienable liberty recognized in the Declaration of Independence] rather than the partic-
ular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.' ").
132 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 2304 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (citing Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thomp-
son, 490 U.S. 454, 460-61, 464-65 (1989)).
134 Id. at 2305.
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Breyer also interpreted the regulations as sufficiently cabining the au-
thority of the officials to create a state authorized liberty interest.
Under Justice Breyer's interpretation, the Hawaii prison rules "(1) im-
pose[d] a punishment that is substantial, (2) restrict[ed] its imposi-
tion as a punishment to instances in which an inmate has committed a
defined offense, and (3) prescribe[d] nondiscretionary standards for
determining whether or not an inmate committed that offense."' 3 5
Justice Breyer argued that where these factors are present, the pre-
Conner procedural due process doctrine enabled the court to deter-
mine whether a right was substantial enough to require procedural
protections. In his view, therefore, a drastic change of the state-au-
thorization approach was unnecessary.
b. Argument for Retaining the "Cabining of Discretion" Test for
Defining Liberty Interests
Justice Breyer addressed what he perceived as the majority's chief
concern prompting the articulation of the atypicality standard: the
federal courts' involvement in the day-to-day management of prisons
through constitutional due process review of "trivial" rights.136 While
agreeing with the majority's concern, Justice Breyer disagreed with
the majority's imposition of "atypicality" as a foundational require-
ment to establishing a liberty interest. Justice Breyer explained that if
the new requirement was meant as a radical change to prior law, "its
generality threatens the law with uncertainty, for some lower courts
may read the majority opinion as offering significantly less protection
against deprivation of liberty, while others may find in it an .extension
of protection to certain 'atypical' hardships that preexisting law would
not have covered."13 7
Justice Breyer presented three sets of considerations to support
his conclusion that a vast revision of the state-authorization approach
was unnecessary. He divided privileges sought by prisoners to be cov-
ered by the state-authorization approach into three categories: (1)
interests that invoke the Due Process Clause in the absence of positive
state law cabining discretion; 38 (2) "a broad middle category of im-
posed restraints or deprivations that, considered by themselves, are
1S5 Id. at 2305-06.
136 Id. at 2306.
137 Id. It is doubtful in reality that lower courts would construe the Conner majority
opinion as expanding prisoner rights in any area. In fact no reported lower court decision
in the aftermath of Conner has held that the "atypicality" standard has expanded prisoner
rights while many have interpreted the decision as representing a dramatic cutback on
prisoner due process. See infra note 167.
138 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 491-94 (1980); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Joint Anti-Facist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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neither obviously so serious as to fall within, nor obviously so insignifi-
cant as to fall without, the [Due Process] Clause's protection";13 9 and
(3) matters that happen to be the subject of prison regulations that
are so insignificant as to be lawful within the context of prison
confinement
40
Justice Breyer identified this so-called "middle category" as the
most difficult to evaluate. He suggested that this difficulty prompted
the Court to develop an additional liberty standard that looked to
state law for guidance in determining liberty interests. Justice Breyer
postulated that unlike free citizens, convicted prisoners are much
more at the mercy of local rules restraining their individual liberty.
The need to look to local rules is therefore increasingly important
because they govern matters that are:
more likely of a kind to which procedural protections historically
have applied, and where they normally prove useful, for such rules
often single out an inmate and condition a deprivation upon the
existence, or nonexistence, of particular facts.... It suggests...
[when] the inmate will have thought that he himself, through con-
trol of his own behavior, could have avoided the deprivation, and
thereby have believed that (in the absence of his misbehavior) the
restraint fell outside the "sentence imposed" upon him.
141
According to Justice Breyer, this rule allows local positivist sources of
law "to separate those kinds of restraints that, in general, are more
likely to call for constitutionally guaranteed procedural protection,
from those that more likely do not." 42
Justice Breyer described his third classification as so unimportant
as to "clearly fall[ ] outside [the] middle category." 43 Recognizing
that some prison regulations that cabin discretionary authority in a
manner sufficient to create a liberty interest "may amount simply to
an instruction to the administrator about how to do his job, rather
than a guarantee to the inmate of a 'right' to the status quo,"' 44 Jus-
tice Breyer argued that "this Court has never held that comparatively
unimportant prisoner 'deprivations' fall within the scope of the Due
Process Clause even if local law limits the authority of prison adminis-
trators. ... 145 Abandoning the wooden approach of a pure state-
authorization doctrine, Justice Breyer suggested letting the courts de-
termine which interests create rights "without the help of the more
139 Id.
140 Id. at 2307.
141 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
142 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143 Id.




objective 'discretion-cabining' test."' This was a burden that he pos-
tulated the courts were well-equipped to undertake. 147 In concluding
this section of his dissent, Justice Breyer suggested, "the problems that
the majority identifies suggest that this Court should make explicit the
lower definitional limit, in the prison context, of 'liberty' under the
Due Process Clause-a limit that is already implicit in this Court's
precedent.' 48
c. Justice Breyer's Application of his Discretion-Cabining Approach
to the Conner Facts
Justice Breyer opened his analysis of the Conner facts by noting
that the Supreme Court and every Circuit Court of Appeals had recog-
nized that punitive segregation could deprive an inmate of a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest. 149 Justice Breyer disagreed with the
majority's assertion that the expungement of Conner's record "trans-
form [ed] Conner's segregation for a violation of a specific disciplinary
rule into a term of segregation under the administrative rules."'5 0 Jus-
tice Breyer's analysis treated the expungement as irrelevant to the lib-
erty interest inquiry. Furthermore, he found that Conner suffered a
significant deprivation under disciplinary rules that sufficiently re-
stricted prison official discretion. Therefore, without reaching
whether Conner received sufficient process, Justice Breyer found "that
Conner was deprived of 'liberty' within the meaning of the Due Pro-
cess Clause."151
III
ANALYSIS. A CALL FOR SUBSTANTIVE MEANING TO
PRISONERS' LIBERTY INTERESTS
The Conner decision has knocked down the "house of cards" that
the positivist state-authorization approach had constructed following
Monissey.15 2 Prior to Conner, the Supreme Court utilized the state-au-
thorization approach as a device to provide constitutional protection
for injuries without inquiring into what liberty interests the Due Pro-
cess Clause itself created. 153 As a surrogate to what the federal Due
146 Id.
147 See id. at 2308.
148 Id. (collecting cases).
149 Id. at 2308-09 (collecting cases). See also infra part III.D.
150 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151 Id. (Justice Breyer noted that the record on appeal did not contain any explanation
of how the witnesses he wanted to call could have provided any relevant evidence). Justice
Ginsburg reached the same conclusion in her analysis. Id. at 2304 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing); see supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 96-112 and accompanying text.
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Process Clause truly entailed, the Court acted as the final insurer of
the proper administration of state prison regulations. Instead of eval-
uating the gravity of harm suffered to determine when process was
necessary, the Court factored in the degree of harm inflicted to deter-
mine what process was due.'54 Conner's "atypicality" requirement now
demands an inquiry into the character of the harm inflicted as an
additional foundational element before it will look to local positivist
sources of law for liberty interests worthy of constitutional protec-
tion. 55 Conner was silent as to what quantum of harm would satisfy
the "atypicality" standard. Equally important, the Conner decision per-
petuated the Court's general resistance to directly reading the Due
Process Clause without support from a positive source of law. Thus,
Conner has functionally removed the only approach that has histori-
cally provided prisoners meaningful due process because of its illogi-
cal reliance on individual state law, and showed no inclination to fill
the resulting gap in due process protection with any sort of uniform
federal standard drawing its justificatory force from the Due Process
Clause.
This Note argues that Connes narrowed approach to positivist
law as an independent creator of protected liberty interests, combined
with its general refusal to read the Due Process Clause directly,
reduces prisoners' due process rights to an unacceptable level. Con-
net's holding renders prisoners susceptible to virtually unlimited
prison official discretion over substantial interests that should invoke
the Due Process Clause on their own weight. Accordingly, this Note
suggests that the Court fill the gap left by its limiting of the state-au-
thorization approach by reading the Due Process Clause directly to
create a federal standard of rights based on a balancing of individual
prisoner interests against the needs of prison administration. The
prisoners' interests analysis should focus on the gravity of harm im-
posed by an official action and the degree to which its imposition
raises the spectre of arbitrary treatment. Balancing the prisoners' in-
terests against the recognized preference, when possible, for discre-
tion in prison administration, will simultaneously accommodate the
needs of prison officials while refocusing the liberty interest analysis
on its most logical objective-protecting the rights of the individual.
A. Predicative Analysis of the Conner Holding and its Likelihood
of Delivering Meaningful Due Process to Prisoners
After Conner, there remain two categories of interests that may
give rise to constitutionally protected liberty interests: the Due Process
154 See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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Clause itself and local positive law sources.15 6 The latter, after Conner,
appears to be limited to interests historically recognized by the Court
as associated with the ultimate liberty from penal restraint. 57 This
narrowing of state-authorization limits state positive law to creating
liberty interests that comport with a concept of "liberty" conceived
when the Constitution was written. Such a narrowing fails to acknowl-
edge that society's concept of "liberty" has changed due to the individ-
ual's reliance on, and vulnerability to, an administrative state that
could not have been anticipated by the Framers. 158 As discussed
above,159 the Court has not, in the decisions since Morrissey, relied
solely on the Due Process Clause, without a co-existent positive law
source, as grounds for finding a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. 160
156 See supra note 65.
157 See Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 (explaining state created liberty interests will be "gen-
erally limited to freedom from restraint... ."). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and
Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. Rv. 85, 97 (1982) (detailing Coke's view of liberty in the Fifth
Amendment as "freedom from physical custody"); Rubin, supra note 6, at 1175-76 (sug-
gesting that criminals should be able to avail themselves of procedural protections more
now than in the past when harsher treatment of prisoners was standard prison practice).
But see Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying
Conner to hold that even loss of ability to accrue good-time credits automatically does not
trigger a liberty interest since it will not" 'inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.'")
(quoting Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2302).
158 Professor Rubin suggests a solution that would allow the Court to follow the past
and adjust to the present:
Since virtually all recent due process cases involve administrative agencies,
the Court does not have to abandon the received tradition; the basic prob-
lem is simply to translate a protection developed for judicial trials into the
administrative context. And since the terms liberty and property are used
in the Constitution in connection with that protection, there is no reason to
rely upon contemporary interpretations of their literal meaning when ana-
lyzing administrative action. The Court could determine what the effect of
this language was in its original context, and then interpret it to achieve the
same effect in administrative cases. In other words, modem procedural
due process issues lend themselves to assessment by analogy. Rather than
starting from first principles and then resorting to textual literalism in their
application, the Court could start from existing doctrine and develop new
solutions by an incremental approach that is more congenial to the case-law
method.
Rubin, supra note 6, at 1046; see alsoJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that due process is a "living
principle" that can evolve).
159 See supra part I.C.
160 See supra note 115. Were the Court to find a protectible liberty interest for prison-
ers, it would be in these cases which involve interference with ultimate liberty. Id.; see also
Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2302 (supporting the contention that state-authorization will now also
generally apply only to freedom from restraint cases); Easterbrook, supra note 157, at 97
(noting that historically the Court only found liberty interests grounded in freedom from
physical restraint). Even in this context, the Court will now strictly require mandatory
language over substantive predicates. In evaluating Conner's claim that his disciplinary
hearing had an effect on his parole standing, the Court explained that "[t]he chance that a
finding of misconduct will alter the balance [of parole likelihood] is simply too attenuated
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Conners functional removal of the state-authorization approach
leaves an impermissible gap in prisoners' rights. Given the Court's
prior precedents, it is virtually impossible for a prisoner to successfully
invoke the Due Process Clause directly;' 61 the only remaining avenue
for a prisoner to receive due process protection in a post-Connerworld
would be to pass the new state-authorization approach narrowed by
the "atypicality" standard. This standard suffers from the same vague-
ness as does the "within the sentence" standard enunciated in
Montayne and used by the Court in its direct analysis of the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Thompson, criticized the
"within the sentence" threshold as inapplicably vague because a typi-
cal prison sentence does little more than specify the amount of time
to be served behind bars.162 Thus, almost any deprivation can con-
ceivably be construed as "within the sentence" of an initial conviction.
Such vagueness renders it impossible to derive any coherent doctrine
from either the "within the sentence" or the "atypicality" thresholds.
Under either test, it appears that as long as a punishment is one that
in some circumstances may be justifiably imposed, it is "an ordinary
incident of prison life."1 63 Therefore, any instance of such a punish-
ment, regardless of extent or the arbitrariness of its imposition, is not
"atypical" and is permissible under a due process analysis. Such treat-
ment does not comport with our society's concept of fairness, even in
the prison context, and should not be construed as permissible. 64
Indeed, if placement in 24 hour-a-day solitary confinement with-
out any process does not satisfy the "atypicality" standard, it is hard
to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause." Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2302.
The Court noted that a similar claim was rejected under the state-authorization doctrine in
Meachum. Id.
161 See Herman, supra note 9, at 534. Professor Herman suggests that, under the
Meachum state-authorization doctrine, "prisoners have no constitutionally protectible lib-
erty interest in decisions affecting the length or conditions of their incarceration unless
state law creates such an interest." Id. A fortiori, prisoners have no such interests after
Conner which narrowed the Meachum doctrine.
162 Thompson, 490 U.S. at 466-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163 See supra part II.B.2.
164 Professor Farina discusses Meachum's dismissal of the prisoner's expectation of
fairness:
When the Meachum [C]ourt dismisses "[w]hatever expectation the prisoner
may have in remaining at a particular prison so long as he behaves himself"
as "too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process pro-
tections," it implies a view of "expectation" that seems to have little to do
with psychological reality. In addition, the doctrine ignores even some for-
mally expressed constraints on behavior.... Most broadly, the doctrine is
wilfully blind to the background understanding-shared by citizens, legisla-
tors and administrators alike-that regulatory programs have comprehensi-
ble, identifiable objectives and that government officials are given power
that they might pursue those objectives, not that they might indulge their
personal predilection or caprice.
Farina, supra note 53, at 228 (citations omitted).
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not to feel Justice Ginsburg's puzzlement as to what deprivation could
satisfy this standard without independently invoking the Due Process
Clause itself.165 Such a paradox, combined with the Court's general
unwillingness to directly read the Due Process Clause, seems to leave
few deprivations in a post-Conner environment that will prompt the
Court to require due process constraints on the discretion of prison
officials.' 66 As one lower court quickly commented after Conner,
the consequence of taking [Conner] at its word ... is to arm prison
authorities, who have heretofore possessed uncircumscribed powers
over the inmates within their custody only to a limited extent, with
now-unrestrained power to punish those inmates by arbitrary reas-
signment to the meaningfully more restrictive environment of seg-
regated confinement. And it appears that can be done by a
correctional official for no reason at all-even out of sheer vindic-
tiveness.... That result-which effectively treats wrongful commitment to
segregation as an inherent consequence, a sort of assumed risk, of being in
prison to begin with-strikes this Court as one more befitting a total-
itarian regime than our own, and it is hard to credit that outcome as
flowing from a principled Supreme Court decision. 16
7
This opinion, if an accurate forecast of the federal courts' reaction to
Conner, defeatsJustice Breyer's contention that the majority's addition
of the "atypicality" requirement did not "significantly revise current
[prisoners' procedural due process] doctrine .... ,,168 This forecast
also raises deep constitutional concerns. There must be a point where
a prison official's action, even if under the rubric of generally ac-
cepted prison practices, becomes so inherently arbitrary or out of pro-
portion with our ideas of liberty that due process concerns are
implicated.
A narrow interpretation of Conner limits it to its unusual circum-
stances. The Conner Court looked to the totality of Hawaii's prison
165 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 160.
167 Leslie v. Doyle, 896 F. Supp. 771, 773-74 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (emphasis added) (foot-
note omitted). The court reluctantly based its decision on what it considered a plain read-
ing of Conner and invited counsel for the plaintiff to bring the case to the appellate level to
test its interpretation. Id. at 774; see also Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995)
(" I] t is difficult to see that any other deprivations in the prison context, short of those that
clearly impinge on the duration of confinement, will henceforth qualify for constitutional
'liberty' status.") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 736 (1996).
168 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d
802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Sandin represents a significant departure from the Court's
§ 1983 prisoner Due Process methodology... ."); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir.
1995) (scope of prisoners liberty interests "has been dramatically narrowed."); Williams v.
Moore, 899 F. Supp. 711, 712-13 (D.D.C. 1995) (stating that Conner "has significantly al-
tered the legal landscape with respect to prisoners' liberty interests."); Nichols v. Ramos,
No. 95-C-4009, 1995 WL 472776, at * 2 (N.D.I1l. Aug. 8, 1995) ("Connerhas set a lower limit
to prisoners' liberty interests under the Constitution."); but seeJones v. Moran, 900 F. Supp.
1267, 1274 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (conceiving the effect of Conner as adding a threshold test).
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regulatory scheme to evaluate the "atypicality" of Conner's depriva-
tion.' 69 The Court does not answer how relevant the existence of
non-disciplinary confinements, the duration of Conner's sentence,
and the severity of the underlying offenses for which Conner was con-
victed, were to its Due Process Clause analysis. 170 Its reiteration of
such factors in this case and in prior treatments of prisoners' due pro-
cess 171 raises the question whether due process fluctuates among pris-
oners in different prisons and between prison institutions in different
states.' 72 If the duration of a punitive confinement sentence is rele-
vant to whether due process protections are necessary in each in-
stance, then courts will be forced to develop some sort of arbitrary
line. The result of such arbitrary line-drawing will be that one day
there is no due process interest and the next day one has magically
appeared.' 73
169 Conner, 115 S.Ct. at 2301.
170 Id. ("Conner's confinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary con-
finement in either duration or degree of restriction."); id. at 2302 ("The regime to which
[Conner] was subjected ... was within the range of confinement to be normally expected
for one serving an indeterminate term of 30 years to life.") (foomote omitted).
171 See supra notes 96-127 and accompanying text.
172 The first cases commenting on Conner have taken different stances on the impor-
tance of the totality of the prison confinement schemes. CompareGotcherv. Wood, 66 F.3d
1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanding for further proceedings because record on totality
of prison confinement schemes was not as complete as the one before the Conner Court),
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (1996);Jones v. Moran, 900 F. Supp. 1267, 1272-73
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ("The [Conner] Court's comparison of conditions of confinement in
Halawa's SHU to the conditions of other levels of confinement in.Hawaii prisons suggests
that the significance of a particular type of deprivation may vary from one state's prison to
another."), with Ishaaq v. Compton, 900 F. Supp. 935, 939 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) ("After...
[Conner], mere confinement to segregation, punitive or administrative, and mere transfers
do not constitute 'atypical and significant hardships' ... and thus cannot amount to the
deprivation of a liberty interest."); Sack v. Canino, No Civ. A. 95-1412, 1995 WL 498709, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1995) (without analyzing totality of Pennsylvania prison scheme, con-
cluded that 30 days in disciplinary confinement did not satisfy "atypicality" test); Steimel v.
Fields, Nos. 92-3274-Des, 93-3190-Des, 1995 WL 530610, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 1995)
("lesser penalties" such as segregative confinements "do not require the application of due
process protections").
This Note suggests, infa notes 200-01 and accompanying text, that the totality of the
country's prison practices should be taken into account to determine a national standard
of prison rights that are not hinged on the norms of an individual institution or the posi-
tive law language of a particular state. Such an approach would allow the development of a
national standards of rights that is based partially on the totality of the states legislatures'
impression of what is liberty.
173 This process has already begun. Compare Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F. Supp. 424, 431
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("376 days in SHU imposed an atypical and significant hardship" creating
a liberty interest), with Zamakshari v. Dvoskin, 899 F. Supp. 1097, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(analyzing the effect of Conner on cases involving disciplinary confinement for periods over
30 days is unclear, but recommending that 60 day confinement is within Connes scope).
Some circuit courts have attempted to resolve this question by remanding to the district
court for an atypicality analysis. See, e.g. Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 537 (7th Cir.
1995) (reversing and remanding case of 6 month segregation); Acker v. Maxwell, 61 F.3d
909 (9th Cir. 1995) (same) (unpublished).
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If such finite factors are indeed relevant, the liberty interest analy-
sis would be cast in a shroud of uncertainty where the success of all
invocations of due process fights would depend on narrow details sur-
rounding a prisoner's confinement. Although such an approach
would give courts the discretion to find rights in extreme circum-
stances without running afoul of Conner, it would also engender un-
predictability because it does not give guidance to prison officials as to
what behavior is permissible. Further, such an approach does not
comport with the concept of a national standard of due process rights
that would logically seem inherent in the existence of a federal Due
Process Clause.
To hinge the due process analysis on positivist state law at all al-
lows states to manipulate a supposedly inherent right through discre-
tion-tolerant legislation. As the Conner majority observed, such a
result encourages legislatures to draft broad regulations to avoid con-
stitutional scrutiny.174 This has the corollary effect of causing consti-
tutional rights to vary across state lines. 175 Instead of focusing
constitutional analysis on statutory or regulatory language that most
prisoners have probably never laid eyes on,176 the Court should strike
out to establish standards that simultaneously accommodate the dig-
nity of the individual by preventing the arbitrary infliction of punish-
ment, and suit the needs of penitentiary administration. Professor
Rubin, commenting on how to formulate a federal standard for mini-
mum due process procedures, wrote:
[m]ore general guidance in formulating criteria can be obtained
from the underlying values that due process serves. The basic value
is to avoid the oppressiveness of particularized decisionmaking.
This suggests the rough but significant idea that particular action
should be allowed only insofar as it is necessary to carry out the
state's established goal.177
Prison officials have a recognized interest in maintaining institutional
order. 78 Any action taken to further this goal should be balanced
against the harm it inflicts on the prisoner's dignity as an individual.
174 Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2299 (state-authorization approach allowed legislatures to
"avoid creation of 'liberty' interests by having scarcely any regulations, or by conferring
standardless discretion on correctional personnel.").
175 See, e.g., Herman, supra note 9, at 574-75 ('The anomalous results of [the state
authorization approach] are all too clear: procedure is carefully doled out where it is least
necessary; identical deprivations of freedom are treated differently, depending on how the
state characterizes the deprivation; the meaning of due process varies from state to state.").
176 See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 466-67 (Marshall,J, dissenting); see also Farina, supra note
53, at 228 (criticizing past precedent for conceiving of prisoner expectations and other
institutional expectations as not reflecting psychological reality).
177 See Rubin, supra note 6, at 1158.
178 See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
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B. Individual Dignity as a Measure of "Grievous Harm" for a
New Due Process Liberty Interest Analysis
The Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly promised to give real
meaning to the Due Process Clause. Goldberg thrust the Court be-
tween the individual and government officials who necessarily exer-
cised sweeping powers over the individual's everyday life. 17 9 Roth and
the cases that followed refused to acknowledge the as-yet-untapped
wellspring of interests within the protection of the Due Process Clause
in order to fulfill Goldberg's goal of maintaining the individual's ability
to protect his place in society. Instead, the Roth Court relied primarily
on sub-constitutional law. Such an approach is inconsistent with the
concept of "liberty." As Professor Farina argues,
[p]recisely because we understand the essence of the Bill of Rights
and 14th Amendment to be [a] constraint on simple-majoritarian
positive law, a doctrine that makes constitutional protection contin-
gent upon the terms of such law is deeply disturbing.... The
phrase 'life, liberty, or property' must possess intrinsic meaning that
is not dependent on positive law.' 80
However, a sampling of the commentary surrounding the Supreme
Court's attempts to define what constitutes "liberty" illustrates why the
Court clung so long to a positivist approach.' 8 '
While most commentators decry the positivist approach, few offer
a coherent and facially applicable alternative. Despite such difficul-
ties, the Court has taken a major step towards the elimination of a
positivist approach to liberty interests. Having done so, the Court
must take the next step and begin to aggressively read the Due Process
Clause itself to provide rights to prisoners in order to prevent grievous
harms from being inflicted on them without at least some minimum
process.'8 2 Otherwise, prison officials will be able to deprive prisoners
of substantial rights "for any reason whatsoever, or for no reason at
all."' 83 AsJustice Marshall wrote, "[o]ne need hardly be cynical about
prison administrators to recognize that the distinct possibility of retali-
atory or otherwise groundless deprivations..- . calls for a modicum of
procedural protections to guard against such behavior."18 4 A due pro-
179 Farina, supra note 53, at 198.
180 Id. at 200-01.
181 See e.g., Rubin, supra note 6, at 1152, 1173-74 (a federal standard is difficult to for-
mulate in "govemment-run institutions" due to the absence of common law precedents
and the novelty of due process standards in the context of institutions, but this does not
mean that such a standard could not be articulated).
182 See, e.g., Herman, supra note 9, at 572 (noting that a grievous loss requirement is a
frequently suggested alternative to the positivist approach stemming from the Roth two-step
analysis).
183 Thompson, 490 U.S. at 466 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 470 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cess construct that does not give effect to such concerns cannot be
reconciled with a national notion of "liberty" safeguarded by the Fed-
eral Due Process Clause.
As Justice Ginsburg argued in her dissent in Conner,185 that "lib-
erty," in the prisoners' due process context, should derive its meaning
and protections from the principles embodied injustice Stevens's dis-
sent in Meachum and Justice Marshall's dissent in Thompson. These
dissents criticize the state-authorization approach and advocate an al-
ternative that would prevent uninhibited state actions that arbitrarily
inflict a "grievous harm" on the individual. "Liberty" is not something
that should be doled out at the whim of state legislators. Rather, it
guarantees "the preservation of the individual from the tyranny of the
collective, the freedom of each to exist as an autonomous being, un-
coerced (except as necessary for the maintenance of societal order)
by the majority's sentiments of appropriate or reasonable behav-
ior."186 Of course a prisoner's rights are curtailed upon incarceration,
but as Justice Stevens wrote:
"The restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction en-
tails do not place the citizen beyond the ethical tradition that ac-
cords respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every individual.
'Liberty' and 'custody' are not mutually exclusive concepts."
It demeans... the concept of liberty [] itself to ascribe to [the
Morriss] holding nothing more than a protection of an interest
that the State has created through its own prison regulations. For if
the inmate's protected liberty interests are no greater than the State
chooses to allow, he is really little more than the slave described in
the 19th century cases.187
The Supreme Court has expressed a willingness in prior decisions
to avoid punishing a prisoner in a fashion that would stigmatize him
or defeat his expectation that he would not be punished absent some
affirmative misconduct on his part. 8 8 Few would contest that adding
process, in an endeavor such as prison disciplinary hearings, would
result in a decrease of erroneous deprivations. 189 Although enhanced
185 See supra part II.C.1.
186 Farina, supra note 53, at 208 (citing Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ.
733, 771 (1964)).
187 Meachum, 427 U.S. at 232-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712-13 (7th Cir. 1973)).
188 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
473-74 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425 (1979)); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74
(1972).
189 Many procedures that serve dignitary interests can be provided at a small cost or
inconvenience to prison administration. Two examples from Wolff are 24 hour notice of
the charges pending against a prisoner and a written statement of the disciplinary board's
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accuracy is not alone enough to implicate the Due Process Clause,
additional procedures also may result in preserving the dignity of indi-
viduals that is intertwined with our societal concept of liberty. AsJus-
tice Frankfurter eloquently expressed in his concurrence to Joint Anti-
Facist League v. McGrath,190."[n]o better instrument has been devised
for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a
better way been found for generating the feeling... that justice has
been done."' 91 In such cases, the Court should actively wield the Due
Process Clause to require such procedural protections. As Professor
Laurence Tribe explains,
both the right to be heard from, and the right to be told why, are
analytically distinct from the right to secure a different outcome;
these rights to interchange express the elementary idea that to be a
person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is
done with one. 19
2
If one goal of imprisoning convicted criminals is indeed to rehabili-
tate, then, for major disciplinary actions, a prisoner should be in-
formed of the reasoning behind the disciplinary action to provide a
reference for reformation of conduct and, when possible, to give him
a chance to defend or deny his conduct. For a prisoner, learning why
a punishment is imposed may" 'fill[ ] a potentially destructive gap in
the individual's conception of himself.' "193 Therefore, the prisoner
should have:
a protected right.., at the minimum, to maintain whatever attrib-
utes of dignity are associated with his status in a tightly controlled
society. It is unquestionably within the power of the State to change
that status, abruptly and adversely; but if the change is sufficiently
grievous, it may not be imposed arbitrarily.
194
Of course, the need to maintain order within prison walls tem-
pers the scope of rights to which a convicted prisoner may lay claim
findings. SeeWolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1974). Both can be produced at a
low cost and yet go a long way to serving the dignitary function discussed infra note 206
and accompanying text. Administrative cost, however, is still a factor in determining what
procedural protections may be afforded to a protected liberty interest.
190 Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
191 Id. at 171-72.
192 TRIBE, supra note 9, § 10-7, at 666; see also Farina, supra note 53, at 214 ("To wreak
harm on the individual without meaningfully consulting him because it is cheaper, or
quicker, or simply less bother not to involve him, is to reduce him to an instrument in the
service of efficiency or inertia.").
193 Farina, supra note 53, at 215 (quoting Frank Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in Procedural Due Process, in NoMos: DUE PROCESS 127 (J. Roland Pennock & John
Chapman eds., 1977).
194 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215; 234 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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and the process that he can receive when a liberty interest is impli-
cated.19 5 Nevertheless, the concept of "liberty," amorphous as it may
be, 9 6 commands that there must be a point, in the balancing of the
interests of the individual and the government, where a prison offi-
cial's ability to arbitrarily injure a prisoner by depriving him of privi-
leges implicates the Due Process Clause, regardless of the existence of
local positive law sources.
197
C. Mathews v. Eldridge. A Guideline for Developing a National
Standard of Federal Due Process Guarantees Through a
Balancing of Individual and Institutional Interests
This Note suggests that the Court should transform its liberty in-
terest inquiry into a balancing of the "grievous harm" created by a
prison official's actions and the interests of safe, cost-effective prison
administration. 98 State-authorization, post-Conner, could remain
where the right itself would not be present "but for" a state's affirma-
tive action. However, these situations are rare. 99 Additionally, state
law can serve as a guideline as to what is reasonable to expect as a
right. Under a balancing analysis, the laws across state boundaries
could have persuasive, but not determinative, effect on the Supreme
Court's analysis.200 The power to create liberty interests will largely be
195 See, e.g., Meaczhum, 427 U.S. at 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196 SeeJoint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (due process should be a living principle not confined to past in-
stances); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 484 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(identifying "liberty" in the prison context is more difficult than in the world'at large).
197 Consider as an illustrative example the Conner regulatory scheme. Under the
Court's holding, there does not appear to be any limit to the amount of time that Conner,
without any process whatsoever, could be restricted to 24 hours a day confinement for the
entirety of his sentence because disciplinary confinement as a punishment, at least under
the Hawaii scheme, never implicates a due process interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.
Ct. 2293, 2302 (1995); see also supra note 95.
198 See Rubin, supra note 6, at 1174-75. Professor Rubin, in attempting to articulate the
opposite ends of the spectrum involved in articulating a federal standard of minimum due
process for the administration of institutions, wrote:
institutional administrators must be afforded discretion in their day-to-day
activities.... To require that every supervisory action follow predefined
rules and be accompanied by procedural protection would ... make the
institution impossible to operate....
At the other extreme, granting supervisors absolute discretion would
violate most people's notion of fair treatment. ... [T]his prohibition on
unfettered discretion has been extended to prisons.
Id.
199 One such situation is the one faced by the Court in Morrissey. As discussed supra
part I-A.2, the Court has held that there is no inherent right to parole, but once the state
affirmatively establishes a parole system, it must provide procedures before parole is
revoked.
200 See Rubin, supra note 6, at 1159 (proposing a federal standard that looks to state law
in general, rather than the particular governmental action under review, to allow fair deci-
sionmaking while respecting overarching social policy considerations).
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vested in the courts which, through reference to the national will of
the country as represented by state legislatures, and the expectations
that regulations tend to give effect to,20 1 create a uniform standard of
liberty interests that is consistent across state lines. Thus, under the
courts' guidance, prison officials can retain discretion over the day-to-
day incidents of prison management to the extent such discretion is
consistent with meaningfiul due process protection of important
interests.20
2
Balancing in the due process context is not a new concept. In-
deed, the Court's pre-state-authorization approach to due process
took the form of a balancing test of the individual and the govern-
ment interests without an independent entitlement analysis. 203 Under
the state-authorization regime, courts balanced the equities of chal-
lenged procedures to determine the second tier analysis of "what pro-
cess is due" under Mathews v. Eldridge.20 4 The three factors identified
by the Mathews Court to determine the procedures afforded to an es-
tablished liberty or property interest provide a transferable framework
to an interest-defining analysis. The Mathews factors are:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of ad-
Justice Breyer alluded to such a use of state law in his Conner dissent. In Justice
Breyer's view, state law
suggests, other things being equal, that the matter [addressed by state posi-
tive law] is more likely of a kind to which procedural protections historically
have applied, and where they normally prove useful, for such rules often
single out an inmate and condition a deprivation upon the existence, or
nonexistence, of particular facts.
Conner, 115 S. Ct. at 2307 (BreyerJ., dissenting). While this analysis makes a lot of sense, it
seems counterintiutive to hinge rights, which may have such a common understanding on
a national scale, on whether an individualstate legislature has addressed them. Under the
approach proposed by this Note, regulations would be read on a national scale in order to
determine what common understandings have been established over time between society
and the individual prisoner.
201 See Rubin, supra note 6, at 1159.
202 Farina, supra note 53, at 226 ("nature and extent of discretion might affect the type
of process afforded, but the presence of discretion would not signal whether process is
useful at all.").
203 See Herman, supra note 9, at 573-74. This pre-state authorization balancing
originated from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149-74 (1951) (Frankfurter, J, concurring). Criticizing mechani-
cal approaches to due process analysis, Justice Frankfurter's approach considered
the precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the man-
ner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alterna-
tives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the
office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt
complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considera-
tions that must enter into the judicial judgment.
Id at 163.
204 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,. -the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirements would entail.
2 0 5
To apply a Mathews-type analysis to define protected interests,
courts would evaluate the prisoner's interest, including the right to be
free from arbitrary or vindictive deprivations. Instead of abstract in-
quiries into unfairness to the individual in relation to his initial con-
viction as applied by the "within the sentence" standard, a Mathews-
type right-defining analysis would look to the treatment of the individ-
ual in reference to our societal concepts of liberty and fairness.
2 0 6
Such an approach would also establish a minimum floor of proce-
dural guarantees that could be applied uniformly across the country, a
concept that comports with our understandings of constitutional
rights.
The second and third prongs of the Mathews balancing approach
would weigh the value of added procedures combined with the indi-
vidual's interests, against the governmental need to retain control
over prison administration and the costs of additional procedures in
fashioning the process due. Not all procedures that give effect to a
prisoner's dignity interest are expensive. Some procedures required
by the Court merely provide notice to the prisoner of what he has
done wrong and give him a chance to explain his side of the story.
2 0 7
As Justice Breyer's dissent in Conner suggests, courts, under the state-
authorization approach, have traditionally eliminated what they deem
as trivial interests by concluding that the prisoner received all the pro-
cess due and thus refuse to require additional procedures.2 0 8 The
205 Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
Although Mathews dealt with a property interest, its test is frequently applied to deter-
mine prison liberty interests. It is nothing new to intermingle property and liberty due
process. Id. at 333 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)); see also Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983) (conducts Mathews balancing to determine prisoner's
rights); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 ("analysis as to liberty parallels the accepted due process
analysis as to property"); JOHN E. NowAK & RONALn D. RorNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
§ 13.8, at 530-32 (5th ed. 1995); Herman, supra note 9, at 500-02 (explaining that the
Supreme Court's approach to liberty and property interests converged around the time of
the Woff decision); but see Rubin, supra note 6, at 1138-39.
206 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (looking to whether consequences vis-
ited on prisoners are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered
by a person convicted of a crime); see also Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995)
(citing Titek); Rubin, supra note 6, at 1175-76 ("focusing on the atypicality of the decision
... avoids the practical difficulties of imposing procedural requirements on day-to-day
activities. A standard based on individual interest, which would direct attention to the
harshness of the punishment regardless of its generality, is significantly less workable in the
institutional context.").
207 See supra note 189.
208 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 (1982); see also Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990) (although court found state authorized rights and interests di-
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proposed balancing approach-would adopt the spirit of such a valua-
tion of competing interests to determine rights, while simultaneously
discarding the fiction of an entitlement prerequisite that led to the
rise of positivism in constitutional jurisprudence. This shift in analysis
would allow judges to afford due process protections that common
sense and common perceptions of "liberty" demand.
20 9
D. Wo/ff Reexamined: A Rare Example of Interest Balancing
Under the State-Authorization Approach
Although Wolff s holding dealt with the procedures required
before state-authorized good-time credits could be revoked, the
Court, in a footnote, provided for similar protections in disciplinary
hearings that result in the imposition of disciplinary confinement.
The relevant language of the footnote reads:
Although the complaint put at issue the procedures employed with
respect to the deprivation of good time, under the Nebraska system,
the same procedures are employed where disciplinary confinement is imposed.
The deprivation of good time and imposition of 'solitary' confine-
ment are reserved for instances where serious misbehavior has oc-
curred. This appears a realistic approach, for it would be difficult
for the purposes of procedural due process to distinguish between the
procedures that are required where good time isforfeited and those that must
be extended when solitary confinement is at issue. The latter represents a
major change in the conditions of confinement and is normally im-
posed only when it is claimed and proved that there has been a
major act of misconduct. Here, as in the case of good time, there
should be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge against arbi-
trary determination of the factual predicate for imposition of the sanc-
tion. We do not suggest, however, that the procedures required by
today's decision for the deprivation of good time would also be re-
quired for the imposition of lesser penalties such as the loss of
privileges.2 10
rectly invoking the Due Process Clause, the state statute prescribed all process constitution-
ally due).
209 See Herman, supra note 9, at 574.
210 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571-72 n.19 (1974) (emphasis added).
The extension of minimum procedural guarantees to disciplinary hearings where pu-
nitive confinement is a possible punishment was not at issue in Wolff The language of
foomote 19 suggests that this protection does not stem from the Constitution or any state-
authorization (as was the case with good-time credits). Rather, the Court added proce-
dural safeguards to all major disciplinary hearings because it would be too difficult to de-
termine, at the outset, whether the hearing would result in the removal of good-time
credits (requiring procedural safeguards), punitive segregation, or both. Although these
procedures had been widely adopted by state legislatures, see generally Babcock, supra note 4
(analyzing the effect of Wolffon due process in prisons), the Conner Court distinguished
the Wolff dicta because the Hawaii statutory scheme did not contain the same overlapping
of procedures as was present in Wolff. See supra note 96.
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Although the extension of procedural protection to disciplinary hear-
ings resulting in disciplinary confinement hinged partly on its linkage
to good-time credits in the relevant statutory scheme, the Court's ex-
tension of protection also clearly depended on the degree of harm
imposed on the prisoner, the expectations of the prisoner as to when
he could be seriously punished, and the danger of arbitrary treatment.
Having held that inmates possess a liberty interest, the Court next
addressed the issue of the applicable standards for determining when
a state may adversely effect that interest.211 The Court balanced the
inmate's liberty interest against the interests of the state prison system.
The Court concluded that although a state must provide some due
process protection, 212 the circumstances of a prison disciplinary hear-
ing did not require as heightened a degree of protection as that af-
forded to parole hearings by Morrissey.
2 13
The Court balanced the prisoner's interest at issue against the
government's interest in maintaining control over prison administra-
tion and concluded that the state's interest in maintaining security
militated against granting absolute rights to retained or appointed
counsel, and against an absolute right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses.21 4 As the Court stated,
The reality is that disciplinary hearings and the imposition of disa-
greeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations between in-
mates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined
and those who would charge or furnish evidence against them. Re-
211 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558-72. The Wolff Court's two tiered approach to prisoner's
due process rights mirrors the approach used in the property context in Board of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See discussion supra part I.C.2.
212 Wolff 418 U.S. at 564-65.
213 According to the Woff Court:
For the prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is not the same imme-
diate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee.... The depri-
vation of good time is unquestionably a matter of considerable importance.
The State reserves it as a sanction for serious misconduct, and we should
not unrealistically discount its significance....
In striking the balance that the Due Process Clause demands, however,
we think the major consideration militating against adopting the full range
of procedures suggested by Monissey for alleged parole violators is the very
different stake the State has in the structure and content of the prison disci-
plinary hearing.
Id. at 560-61.
The Wolff decision established two absolute rights. First, the Court required that the
prisoner receive written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hear-
ing. Id. at 563-64. Second, the Court mandated that following the hearing, the inmate
must receive a "written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the disciplinary action taken." Id.
214 Id. at 567-68. The State's interest in maintaining security is in the forefront of the
Supreme Court's concern in many decisions relating to the prison disciplinary system. See
Diane E. Wolf and Timothy R- Yee, Project: Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEo. L.J. 1365, 1368 (1994).
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taliation is much more than a theoretical possibility; and the basic
and unavoidable task of providing reasonable personal safety for
guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of
disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of personal
antagonism on the important aims of the correctional process.215
Thus, in the Court's view, if inmates were allowed to exercise these
rights in all circumstances, "there would be considerable potential for
havoc inside the prison walls."216 However, the Court did recognize
qualified rights to counsel and to call witnesses when doing so would
not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals.
2 17
Wolffs interest-balancing approach to disciplinary hearings that
result in punitive confinement is instructive because it demonstrates
the possibility of simultaneously giving effect to the individual pris-
oner's liberty interests and to the needs of prison administration. The
Court's willingness and ability to forge an accommodation in the disci-
plinary hearing context, simultaneously one of the most confronta-
tional aspects of prison administration and yet one of the most
"ordinary incidents" of prison discipline, should be equally applicable
in most other areas of prison administration. Sometimes the courts
will find that a prisoner's interest is insufficient compared to the need
for discretion in prison administration, but at a minimum, the courts
will recognize that prisoners do have rights upon entering the prison,
and that a prison official's discretion is not unfettered.
CONCLUSION
Sandin v. Conner has brought prison context procedural due pro-
cess back full circle to its pre-Goldberg era position. Strictly read, the
decision accords prison officials virtually the same unfettered discre-
tion they enjoyed until the 1960s. The Court's retraction of its prison-
215 Woff, 418 U.S. at 562.
216 Id. at 567.
217 Id. at 566. The Court was wary of excessively limiting the discretion of prison offi-
cials in an area that could have serious safety and institutional consequences. The Court
explained:
The operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily diffi-
cult undertaking. Many prison officials, on the spot and with the responsi-
bility for the safety of inmates and staff, are reluctant to extend the
unqualified right to call witnesses; and in our view, they must have the nec-
essary discretion without being subject to unduly crippling constitutional
impediments.
Id. at 566-67. Affording a prisoner twenty-four hours written notice of a charge and a
written statement of findings .is good policy and fairly easy to provide. See generaly Michael
A. Guzzo, Note, The Written Statement Requirement of Wolff v. McDonnell: An Argument for
Factual Specificity, 55 FoRDHAM L. REv. 943 (1987) (suggesting that Wolffwritten statements
must be fairly extensive in order to provide an adequate record for administrative orjudi-
cial review); see also discussion supra accompanying notes 151-56.
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context due process jurisprudence in Conner was largely motivated by
its dependence on positivist sources of state law to authorize federal
constitutional rights. This resulted in the federal court system being
drawn in to measure fairly minute interests on a constitutional scale.
The retraction of the positivist approach should not, however, sig-
nal the end of due process within the prison walls. It is time for the
Supreme Court to recognize that there exist interests so important to
a prisoner's individual liberty that the Court must protect them under
the direct command of the Due Process Clause. Although the inter-
ests of prison administration must, of course, remain in the prison
due process analysis, the Court stands as the only true protector of a
prisoner "against [the] arbitrary action of government."218 Although
the due process liberty interest has proven one of the most difficult
for the Court to ascribe any meaningful content, the Court's failure to
accept its role of defining its scope is tantamount to refusing its chief
duty as interpreter of the Constitution.
Philip W. Sbaratta4
218 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
t I would like to thank my parents for their unwavering love and support, Professor
Cynthia Farina, and the Note Office of the Comell Law Review.
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